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Abstract
This thesis explores the idea of money and credit as complementary media of exchange. 
Complementarity has interesting implications for the effects of monetary policy on macro- 
economic variables. The impact of inflation is markedly different in a world in which money 
and credit are complementary or substitute, i.e. cooperate or compete. In the first chapter, 
I review some recent literature on the coexistence of money and credit in matching models 
of money 4 la Kiyotaki and Wright and in models with spatial separation & la Townsend. I 
argue that the literature, virtually without exceptions, has seen money and credit as com­
peting media of exchange and concentrated on the role of record keeping technologies in 
supporting credit as a medium of exchange. Moreover, money doesn’t normally serve to 
clear debts. In chapter 2, I construct an economy with microfoundations for the use of 
money and bilateral credit as media of exchange. The model features spatial separation,
uney and credit are payment: in equilibrium, bilateral credit is paid back with money. M
iffect. The nominal complementary. Complementarity generates a reverse Mundell-Tobin
ie real interest rate interest rate is more than unit elastii
3interesting applications of the model. First a model in which agents in equilibrium endoge­
nously decide to become debtors or creditors. Second the issue of seigniorage and finally 
the question of circulation of promises. In chapter 5, I consider the question of coexistence 
and social benefits of having a zero rate of return asset -fiat money- and an illiquid nominal, 
risk-free, interest bearing bond. I consider the model by Kocherlakota (2003) where illiquid 
bonds coexist with money because they serve to insure against liquidity shocks. I introduce 
a commitment technology giving agents the ability to issue promises fully backed by bonds. 
I show that illiquidity is not sufficient to guarantee a role for bonds. For illiquid bonds 
to be essential some legal restrictions on the issue of promises backed by bonds should be 
introduced. Finally I present a model in which changes in the liquidity of assets generate 
interesting predictions about the riskiness of projects undertaken in the economy, output 
and welfare. In the last chapter, coauthored with Raoul Minetti, we develop a theory of the 
interaction between the entry of lenders and the real sector. The high liquidation skills of 
incumbent lenders render them too tough in terminating high-risk/return projects. Being 
“foreign” to the market, newcomers have lower ability to liquidate than incumbents. This 
makes them softer in liquidating high-risk/return projects but renders their funding more 
costly. We show that the entry of lenders and the share of high-risk/return projects can 
reinforce each other through firms’ liquidation values. This interaction dampens the output 
impact of liquidity shocks. Hence, financial liberalization can enhance stability.
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Introduction
"This, as I see it, is really the central issue in the pure theory of money. Either 
we have to give an explanation of the fact that people do hold money when rates 
of interest axe positive or we have to evade the difficulty somehow" (Hicks (1935). 
John Hicks suggests that the answer to the central issue in the pure theory of money 
is frictions.
Frictions are necessary to generate a role for money as a medium of exchange. 
Absence of double coincidence of wants, spatial separation, absence of a record keep­
ing technology and absence of commitment have been advocated to explain the use 
of money to lubricate exchange. Unfortunately some of these frictions, while making 
room for money, prevent the use of alternative -interest bearing- media of exchange 
like credit. A recent theoretical literature studies credit as a medium of exchange 
introducing a record keeping technology. Trade can be monitored and agents can 
be punished for not keeping their promises. Money and credit are typically seen as 
substitute, competing means of exchange. Money never plays the role of the means 
of payment, i.e. the means to repay promises. The literature has largely ignored the 
fact that money and credit can be complementary, with money being the means of 
payment as well as a medium of exchange. This thesis explores the idea of credit 
as a bilateral promise of future money and money and credit as complementary or 
cooperating media of exchange. This turns out to have interesting implications for 
the effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables. The impact of inflation
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is markedly different in a world in which money and credit cooperate instead of 
competing.
The first four chapters of the thesis deal with the issue of the coexistence of 
money and credit as media of exchange. The fifth chapter concerns the role of 
the liquidity of alternative interest-bearing assets -e.g. bonds- in insuring against 
liquidity shocks. The last chapter -which is based on a paper coauthored with Raoul 
Minetti- examines a more applied issue relating to the liquidity of assets. Differences 
in the liquidity of assets can have an impact on the riskiness of projects undertaken, 
on output and welfare in the economy.
In the first chapter, I review some recent literature on the coexistence of money 
and credit in matching models of money & la Kiyotaki and Wright and in models 
with spatial separation & la Townsend. I argue that the literature, while stressing 
the relationship of substitutability between money and credit, has overlooked the 
fact that money and credit might in some cases be complementary. This may have 
important implications for monetary policy.
In chapter 2 ,1 construct an economy with microfoundations for the use of money 
and bilateral credit as media of exchange. The model features spatial separation, 
absence of double coincidence of wants and competitive markets. Money is the 
means of payment: in equilibrium, bilateral credit is paid back with money. Money 
and credit are complementary. Complementarity generates a reverse Mundell-Tobin 
effect. The nominal interest rate is more than unit elastic in the inflation rate and 
therefore the real interest rate increases with inflation. The credit to money and 
credit to output ratios, output and welfare all decrease with inflation. A model 
where the two media of exchange are complementary generates opposite predictions 
on the effect of inflation on credit with respect to a model where money and credit 
are substitute.
In chapter 3, I consider a modification of the model presented in the previous
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chapter where the elasticity of the interest rate is less than one. This shows that 
what is really crucial is that the elasticity is different from one. While there is in the 
literature a consensus that empirically the elasticity is not unitary, it is less clear 
whether the elasticity is greater or smaller than one. I then use macroeconomic data 
for 59 countries over the period 1993-2003 to estimate the elasticity of the nominal 
interest rate with respect to the inflation rate. I find an elasticity significantly greater 
than one. I also test the prediction on Credit/GDP.
The model presented in the previous chapters has the potential to address a 
number of issues relating to the role of money and credit and the interaction with 
monetary policy. In chapter 4, I discuss two applications. First, I analyze the 
decision to become a borrower or a lender in more details, proposing a model in 
which in equilibrium agents endogenously partition between borrowers and lenders. 
Second I consider the possibility that the government, instead of making transfers 
to agents, prints money and buys commodities on the market . Finally, I speculate 
on the possibility of circulating promises.
In chapter 5, I consider the question of coexistence and social benefits of having 
two assets: a zero rate of return asset -fiat money- and an illiquid nominal, risk-free, 
interest bearing bond. In Kocherlakota (2003) illiquid bonds are socially beneficial 
since they allow agents to insure against liquidity shock. Here I introduce a com­
mitment technology allowing agents to issue promises fully backed by bonds. When 
the liquidity shock is sufficiently high, legal restrictions can be advocated to prevent 
agents from issuing promises.
Finally I present a model in which changes in the liquidity of assets generate 
interesting predictions about the riskiness of projects undertaken in the economy, 
output and welfare. In the last chapter, coauthored with Raoul Minetti, we develop 
a theory of the interaction between the entry of lenders and the real sector. The high 
liquidation skills of incumbent lenders render them too tough in terminating high-
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risk/return projects. Being “foreign” to the market, newcomers have lower ability to 
liquidate than incumbents. This makes them softer in liquidating high-risk/return 
projects but renders their funding more costly. We show that the entry of lenders 
and the share of high-risk/return projects can reinforce each other through firms’ 
liquidation values. This interaction dampens the output impact of liquidity shocks. 
Hence, financial liberalization can enhance stability.
Chapter 1
M oney and Credit in M onetary 
Economies
1.1 Introduction
The fundamental issue in the pure theory of money is to explain why people axe 
willing to hold worthless, non interest-bearing pieces of paper and use them in the 
process of exchange. The basic idea -as old as monetary theory- is that the use 
of money is motivated by absence of double coincidence of wants: if an economist 
and a hairdresser meet, it may happen that the economist wants a haircut but 
the hairdresser doesn’t want an economics lecture, in which case trade cannot take 
place without a medium of exchange of some sort. This is however not enough 
to explain why people hold money, since in principle the economist could buy on 
credit. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) explicitly formalize the former situation using a 
search-matching model, in which absence of double coincidence of wants is the main 
ingredient and several other frictions make credit systems difficult to implement. 
Alternatively when markets are spatially separated as in models a’ la Townsend 
(1980), money serves as a carrier of value between markets, provided there are
12
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impediments to the use of credit. Therefore, it is crucial to explain why agents use 
simultaneously money and credit.
The present chapter is a review of the literature that has recently dealt -in the 
matching and in the spatial separation traditions- with the latter issue: the co­
existence of money and credit as media of exchange. This is an important issue 
not only from a theoretical point of view but also for monetary policy reasons. As 
Kocherlakota (2003) put it: ’’real life monetary policy is primarily about interest 
rates -that is the relative price of money and claims to future money-. The basic 
literature generally abstracts from other assets besides money, and offers no com­
pelling reason why societies need risk-free claims to future money as well as money 
itself.” A first step toward such real life monetary policy analysis involves construct­
ing models were money coexists with alternative assets. With few exceptions, the 
literature has followed a paper by Kocherlakota (1998) -where money is seen as a 
form of memory- in seeing the absence of a record keeping technology as the crucial 
feature that prevents credit from working. Both in the matching and the spatial 
separation literature the emphasis has been on the possibility to monitor agents 
in various ways and to different degrees. Credit thus has been seen as a sort of 
centralized contract among agents, implemented through a monitoring technology, 
while money as a useful device for agents that cannot be monitored or drop out of 
the contract. Implicitly the two instruments are always seen as substitute. Money 
is never used as a means of payment -i.e. as a means to repay promises. An idea 
of complementarity between money and credit is absent from the literature. I will 
argue that to view money and credit as substitute rather than complementary is not 
indifferent when monetary policy issues are addressed.
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1.1.1 Overview
A very recent literature has explained -within the theoretical framework of a random 
matching model- the coexistence of means of exchange with different rates of return, 
relaxing some of the assumptions that were made in the original work by Kiyotaki 
and Wright (1989). The literature concentrated on the absence of a monitoring 
technology and on the impossibility for individuals to commit to future actions. If 
all transactions were recorded on a computer money would completely disappear. 
The imperfections in the record keeping technology could thus explain the use of both 
money and credit in our economies. This approach was followed by Kocherlakota 
and Wallace (1998) and Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999).
Shi (1996) focused instead on the limitation of commitment. If agents are unable 
to commit to future actions, credit will not emerge. If commitment is unlimited, on 
the other hand, no one will use money and trade will be organized exclusively on 
a credit basis. The idea in Shi (1996) is to secure credit with the use of collateral: 
agents can commit up to the limit of the value of the collateral, otherwise they use 
money to trade. I pursue this approach further in chapter 2.
Other papers focus on the use of credit in enduring relationships. In the models 
I will examine -by Jin and Temzelides (2001) and Corbae and Ritter (2004)- the 
idea of substitution between money and credit is even more explicit: money may 
actually reduce the incentives to enter in credit relationships.
A related literature looks at the question of private versus public money. Inter­
est in the question, dating back at least to Hayek and Friedman, has been revived 
by new developments in the use of stored-value cards and advances in the payment 
systems. In Williamson (1999) banks are able to issue notes backed by productive 
investments funded by agents when they visit the bank. Abstracting from asym­
metric information and lemons problems, the introduction of private money, since 
it stimulates investment, seems to unambiguously enhance welfare. When possible
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inefficiencies of private money axe taken into account however, it may be beneficial 
to ban private issue and stick to public money. Again the two instruments are seen 
as alternative. I also present three very recent papers exploring the combination 
of money, credit and banking in search economies, namely Berentsen, Camera and 
Waller (2004), Faig (2004) and He,Huang and Wright (2003).
I then consider the literature in the spatial separation tradition, where I examine 
the recent efforts to introduce credit alongside money in the turnpike model and in 
the Cass-Yaari model. Again -following an idea developed by Townsend (1989)- 
credit has been seen as a useful medium of exchange when there is the possibility to 
monitor trading histories or in enduring relationships. I finally look at a literature on 
payment systems, where the issue of substitution versus complementarity becomes 
relevant for monetary policy issues. What is the correct behavior of a Central Bank 
in the presence of both money and a payment system? Is inflation bad -as in Freeman
(1996)- or good -as in Williamson (2002)- for the working of the payment system? 
As emphasized by Green (2003) inflation may destroy the acceptability of money 
in a model featuring substitutability but not in a model featuring complementarity 
-in a model where money serves as the means to settle debt-. Inflation may favour 
credit or it may discourage it. I will discuss these points further in the following 
chapters.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic matching 
model of money and discusses coexistence in that framework. Section 3 deals with 
the question of coexistence of money and credit in models with spatial separation. 
Section 4 concludes.
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1.2 T he M atching M odel
1.2.1 T h e basic M od el
I will follow Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Trejos 
and Wright (1995) in describing the random matching model of money. The aim of 
the literature on the search-theoretic approach to monetary economics is to generate 
a role for money in lubricating the process of exchange. The first essential feature 
to generate a role for money is some form of absence of double coincidence of wants. 
This has been considered - at least since the time of Menger and Wicksell- one of the 
crucial prerequisite to generate a role for money. Otherwise all trades would involve 
just barter and no monetary exchange. This is embedded into the model as follows.
In the economy there axe N  > 3 different production opportunities. Opportunity 
i is used to produce good i. Goods are perishable, in the sense that they have to be 
consumed immediately after trade otherwise they are lost. The economy is inhabited 
by N  types of agents with a [0,1] continuum of each type. Agents of type i produce 
good i -1-1 (modulo N)  and consume i. Agents derive utility from consumption. 
The utility function u(q) -where q is the quantity of the good- is twice continuously 
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, with u(0) =  0,u'(0) =  oo and 
u'(oo) =  0. Each agent incurs a production cost in terms of utils given by c{q) =  q. 
The rate of time preference r > 0 is the same for all agents. Time continues for ever. 
This is necessary to induce people to voluntarily hold intrinsically useless pieces of 
paper (fiat money). If the time horizon were finite, no agent would be willing to 
accept money in the last period and working backward no agent would be willing 
to accept money at all. This feature also suggest that money will be held and 
exchanged because agents expect it to be accepted in the future by someone else.
Each agent maximizes the expected discounted utility of consuming minus the
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cost of producing
^  5 3 ( 1^ 7 )  (“ ( « ) - * )
At time t an agent meets randomly (according to a process specified below) 
another agent and produces for him. In the following period the same agent will 
start searching for his own consumption good. Production and consumption cannot 
happen in the same period.
There exists in the economy one intrinsically useless and durable1 object called 
fiat money. Money is indivisible and agents can hold one unit of money or nothing. 
This zero/one restriction on the portfolios of money that agents can hold is due to 
the technical difficulty of keeping track of the holdings of money of a continuum 
population that -as it is explained below- meets at random. Among each type there 
is a mass M  of agents that hold one unit of fiat money and 1 — M  that hold nothing. 
There is no market place. People are randomly assigned to meet bilaterally. In each 
period the arrival rate of trading partners is a Poisson process with constant rate 
a > 0. The randomness assumption together with the fact that there is a continuum 
of agents of each type rules out the possibility of the circulation of bilateral promises 
since the probability of a promise to get back to the issuer and be repaid is zero. 
This implies that there wouldn’t be anyone willing to accept a promise in the first 
place. There is no record keeping technology other than money. This assumption 
is motivated by the fact that money wouldn’t be essential in the presence of a 
centralized record keeping technology monitoring agents. Trade is observable only 
by the two agents involved. Agents cannot commit to perform future actions. This 
assumption is also crucial to obtain a role for money. If agents could costlessly 
commit to keep their promises there would be no need for money.
Due to the randomness of the matching process there are many meetings in
xThe fact that fiat money is durable while goods are perishable is to avoid the complication of 
having to consider commodity money.
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which nothing happens and only some meetings in which exchange takes place. If a 
type i and a type j  ^  i + l , i  — 1 meet nothing happens. These are no-coincidence 
meetings, since type i doesn’t want to consume what type j  produces and viceversa. 
An interesting meeting is on the contrary a meeting between type i and a type 
j  = i + 1  or j  = i — 1. In this case there is single coincidence of wants, namely one of 
the two partners wanting what the other produces but having nothing -in terms of 
consumption goods- to offer. If the potential consumer has money, trade can take 
place; otherwise nothing happens. When a money holder meets a producer of his 
consumption good who doesn’t hold money, he offers one unit of money for qm units 
of the good. If exchange takes place he consumes and returns home. To determine 
the quantity produced qm -which gives also implicitly the relative price of money 
and goods it is assumed that when the two partners meet they bargain over the 
terms of trade using a Nash Bargaining procedure. In particular they will split the 
surplus generated by trade according to their relative bargaining power:
Max (Vm - V p -  qm)e (u(qm) + VP -  Vm)l~e
Qm
s.t. Vm Vp qm > 0 
^ {Qm,) "b Vp Vm ^  0
where Vm is the value function of a money holder, Vp is the value function of 
a producer and 9 € [0,1] is the bargaining power of a producer. In most of the 
discussion below for simplicity take 9 = 0, thus giving all the bargaining power to 
money holders, who in fact will make take-it-or-leave-it offers to producers. This 
assumption -without affecting in any substantial way the results- will reduce the for­
mer maximization problem to a situation in which the producer will get zero surplus
and consumers will get all the positive surplus (if surplus were zero or negative the
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outcome would be no-trade):
V m  V p  Q m  —  0
"b Vp Vm > 0
The second inequality is an Incentive Condition insuring that money holders are 
willing to give up money to consume.
In a stationary equilibrium the value functions are given by the following system 
of equations:
where x  =  1 /N  is the probability of a single coincidence meeting, a  is the 
probability of meeting someone and (1 — M)  is the probability of meeting an agent 
without money and M  is the probability of meeting a money holder.
A money holder when meeting the ’’right” producer -which happens with prob­
ability <j(1 — M)x-  consumes, looses money and becomes a producer. A producer 
with probability o M x  meets the ’’right” money holder, produces for him and gets 
money, obtaining zero surplus from the deal.
Solving system (1):
vVm — 0"(1 M )x  {u{qm) -b Vp Vm) 
rVp = o M x  ( -q m +  Vm ~ Vp) = 0
(1.1)
0
and using the take-it-or-leave-it condition:
Qm —  Vm  —
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which gives the equilibrium value qm. Moreover u(qm) > qm is clearly verified for 
any M  G (0,1). This proves that a monetary equilibrium exists for any M  G (0,1). 
It is worth emphasizing that there always exists also a non-monetary equilibrium. 
This phenomenon, which is also present in other models of monetary economies like 
the overlapping generations model, is due to the fact that money in the matching 
model is used as a medium of exchange because agents expect it to have value in 
the future for other agents. If however agents expect money to be valueless, the 
expectation will be self-fulfilling and money will not be used at all2. Agents use 
money because they expect other agents to accept it in the future.
1.2 .2  R estr iction s on  M on ey  H oldings
One of the features making the matching model of money tractable -i.e. the {0,1} 
restriction on money holdings- forecloses the possibility to address monetary policy 
questions. One of the main efforts in the recent literature on the pure theory of 
money has been to get rid of the restriction while preserving the nice microfoundation 
for the use of money. Lagos and Wright (2002) modify the previous setting by 
introducing two types of commodities: general and special goods. There is absence of 
double coincidence of wants for special goods, while general goods are produced and 
consumed by everyone. The utility U (X )of consuming the general good is increasing 
and concave and the cost to produce it is C(X)  = X.  Special goods are exchanged 
during the day on a matching basis, while general goods are exchanged during the 
night in a centralized market. Terms of trade axe determined by bargaining in the 
matching market, while in the centralized market one dollar buys </> units of the 
general good. Let F  be the distribution of money holdings in the decentralized 
market: F{rh) is the measure of agents holding m < r h  units of money. If M  is the
21 only mentioned pure strategy equilibria. There exist however also a stationary mixed strategy 
equilibrium and non-stationary sunspot equilibria where the probability that money is used varies 
over time.
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total money stock, F  will satisfy J  mdF{m) = M  at every date. Let F(m , 0, F) be 
the value function for an agent with m  units of money entering the decentralized 
market and W (m, 0, F) the value function of the agent when he enters the centralized 
market and q(m, m, 0, F) and d(m , m, 0, F) respectively the quantity of goods and 
money changing hands in a single coincidence meeting between a buyer with m 
units of money and a seller with m units of money. Agents discount the future at a 
rate ft =  In recursive form the problem for an agent entering the decentralized 
market can be written as
V(m, 0, F ) — ax J  [u (q(m, m, 0, F)) +  W (m  — d(m, m, 4>, F))] dF(rh) +
+ax J  [—q(m)m,(j),F) + W (m  + d(m,m,  0, F))] dF(m)  +
+  (1 — 2ax) W (m, 0, F)
where the first integral represents the buyer’s side, the second integral the seller’s side 
and the third part a no-coincidence meeting. When the agent enters the centralized 
market, he faces the following maximization problem:
W (m ,0 ,F ) =  m a x U ( X ) - Y  + 0V(m',4JtF')
X,Y,m'
s. t .X  =  Y  +  0m — (f>m!
By solving backwards, starting from the centralized market, an expression is 
obtained for W (m, 0, F)  which is linear in m  :
W(m,  0, F) = U(X*)  -  X* +  0m +  max -  0m' +  pV(m',  0', F ') =  W (0 ,0, F) +  0m
m'
Quantities are determined using bargaining. Assuming that consumers have all
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the bargaining power:
—q +  W (m  +  d, 0, F) — W (m, <j>,F) = 0
using the fact that W (m  +  d,(f>,F) — W(ra, 0, F) +  the previous expression 
becomes
—g +  (j>d =  0
The value function for the decentralized market -which can be shown to exist, 
to be unique, differentiable and strictly concave- becomes then
V(m, (f), F) = maxcrx [u (q(m)) — (pd(m)] +  U(X*) — X* + <f>m — (frm! + fiV (m;, <p', F ')m'
with the first order condition
and the envelope
V '(m } <j), F) =  ax \y! (q(m)) q'(m) — (j>\ -f (f)
Lagos and Wright (2002) show that in any monetary equilibrium the distribution 
F  is degenerate and every agent chooses the same m! = m  = M. This also implies 
d = m. In a steady state </>' =  <f) = jfc.
Combining the last two equations in a steady state I get
u' (9) = 1 +
which gives the unique solution q. The incentive condition u{q) > q is also verified 
at q since u'{q) > 1.
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To summarise the discussion. Any monetary equilibrium implies m  = M  with 
probability 1, which gives d = m. A steady state q exists and is unique, it has q < q* 
-where q* is the efficient level of production (u'(q*) =  1)- and increasing in and 
<j x . Nominal variables axe proportional to M  and real variables are independent of 
it. It can be easily shown that the optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule.
Intuitively, the centralized market serves the purpose of making the distribution 
of money holdings degenerate. The main difficulty with a matching model with 
general money holdings is the ability to keep track of each agent’s holdings: the 
distribution may become so complicated as to make the analysis impossible. Quasi­
linearity eliminates the wealth effects: the value function on the central market is 
linear in m  and m'  is independent of m, agents adjust their money holdings on the 
central market in such a way that everyone at the end of the round of trade holds 
the same amount. This makes the distribution degenerate and the model tractable. 
A different idea involving households with a continuum of members is used by Shi
(1997) to achieve the same result.
1.2 .3  C red it in  th e  M atch in g  M od el
In recent years there have been several attempts to modify the matching model de­
scribed above to allow for the use of credit as a medium of exchange alongside money. 
I will focus on some papers that have obtained the result, modifying two crucial as­
sumptions of the matching model. I will first review the papers by Kocherlakota and 
Wallace (1998) and Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) and then Shi (1996). The first 
two introduce an imperfect record keeping technology while the third introduces the 
possibility for people to costly commit to future actions. I will then move to models 
where credit arises in enduring relationships, like in Jin and Temzelides (2001) and 
Corbae and Ritter (2004).
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On the absence of a record-keeping Technology
Suppose society has a public record of individual histories, in the sense that every 
trade is recorded in a computer costlessly accessible by everybody3. If the record is 
updated for sure and continuously the whole process of exchange could be organized 
using simply credit. No agent would have the incentive to deviate from the credit 
arrangement, since everybody would immediately discover the defector and punish 
him refusing to trade with him for ever. The purely monetary economy is at the 
other extreme, without any public record of past trade.
Assume that the public record of histories is updated probabilistically4. Every 
period there is a probability 7r that the record is updated. In this economy there are 
(potentially) several groups of agents behaving differently: money holders, agents 
that conduct trade using credit, defectors i.e. agents that used credit to consume 
but didn’t repay and producers.
rVm = <7(1 - M ) x (u (Qm) 4“ Yp -Vm)
rVc = <j (1 ■- M ) x (u(qc) + VP - Vc)
rVj =  ( 1 - 7r)a(l -  M )x  (u(q'c) + v ;  -  v?)
rVp = rv ; = 0
The first value function describes money holders and is interpreted as before. 
The second concerns people using the credit system. With probability cr(l — M)x  
they meet the right producer and exchange happens. In the next period they are 
supposed to produce for someone else to repay. The third equation describes agents 
defecting from the credit arrangement. With probability 7r the record is updated 
and they are discovered and punished by all the others: they will never consume
3 One could interpret the record keeping technology as a credit card system.
4 In Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) a different approach based on mechanism design is used. 
In this section I adapt those results to a standard matching model.
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again. With probability (1 — 7r) they continue undiscovered to consume. Producers 
-that have not and have defected in the past (Vp and Vp respectively)- are down to 
zero because of the take-it-or-leave-it offers.
To sustain an equilibrium with both money and credit it has to be that the 
following incentive conditions are verified:
Money holders want to give up money for consumption
'U'{Qm) "H Vp — Vm >  0
Agents consuming on credit have a positive surplus
u(qc) +  Vp -  Vc >  0
Agents don’t want to defect from the credit arrangement
Vc > V'
The last incentive condition is the crucial one to get an equilibrium with money 
and credit. Solving the system of value functions:
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and from the take-it-or-leave-it offers condition
<j(l — M )x  ,
Qm =  —7Z n/r\ ■ U Vlrn<j(l — M)x  +  r 
_  <j(1 — M )x
q° <7(1  -  M )x  +  r q^°
, =  (1 — tt)ct(1 - M ) x  ( ,
q° { l - n ) a ( l - M ) x  + r Kq°
which immediately imply that qm =  qc and that the first two incentive conditions 
are verified. Moreover Vm = Vc > Vf.
r7rcr(l — M )x  > 0
which is verified for 7r > 0. Finally observe that when 7r —> 1 the last incentive 
condition becomes less stringent until tt =  1 where the condition is equivalent to the 
second incentive condition. At this point people are just indifferent between using 
money or credit. Notice that when there is no record keeping technology (7r =  0) 
credit doesn’t work.
Money and credit from this perspective are purely substitute. Welfare increases 
when 7r increases, i.e. when the record keeping technology becomes more and more 
efficient in detecting defectors. The welfare problem is defined as follows
M a x W  = MVm + CVc s.t.Vc > V '
7r
observe that the welfare function is independent of n. Only the constraint depends on 
7r through V'c : for agents to obtain some positive surplus it has to be that defection is 
not profitable. C  is the proportions of agents that consume on credit. To characterize 
the solution to the problem in 7r, it is thus enough to compute the derivative of V'c 
with respect to 7r:
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dV'  2(1 -  tt) \<j { 1 -  M)x}2 +  ra{ 1 -  M )s ,
[(1 — 7r) [cr(l — M )x ] +  r]2 °
To quote Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998): ’’Technological advances improve 
welfare through their effect on the way transactions are made”. In Cavalcanti and 
Wallace (1999), the population is divided in two subgroups: in one group agents’ 
histories cannot be monitored while in the second group histories are completely 
monitored. The latter group is meant to represent stylised bankers, people that can 
issue private -or inside- money. Private money is accepted because, should bankers 
refuse to redeem it, they would be punished by being excluded from trade for ever. 
The focus of the paper is to prove that inside money is better than outside money, 
being able to implement a wider range of allocations. I will come back to this idea 
later when I will describe the model by Williamson (1999).
Finally, Aiyagari and Williamson (1998) have a similar model in which consumers 
enter into long-term contracts with a financial intermediary. Each period a fraction 
of the people cannot enter the long-term contract. Agents can defect from the 
long-term contract and trade every period on the money market. Monetary policy 
affects the decision to stick to the contract. Inflation reduces the incentives to 
defect inducing people to economise on real money balances and increases welfare 
dispersion and consumption variability across the population.
On the Com m itm ent assum ption
Shi (1996) explores a different idea to generate a role for credit. A crucial assumption 
in the matching model is that people cannot commit to future actions. Assume that 
there is a way of partially committing to future action in the form of collateral. In 
particular each agent has a personalized consumption tool -think of a spoon- which 
is necessary to consume. Without their spoons agents are unable to consume. In 
this case an agent without money can write a promise to his trading partner and
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give him his spoon as a guarantee of repayment. For the potential creditor to accept 
the promise, credit should yield a higher rate of return than money, or he would 
be better off waiting for a money holder to come. Creditors stay out of exchange 
and wait for the debtor5. There is no record keeping technology and the structure 
is maintained as before.
Among each type there are M  money holders, P  producers, C  creditors and 
D debtors. In a stationary equilibrium, the proportions of new debtors have to 
be equal to the proportion of agents redeeming their promises -i.e. the total stock 
of promises has to be constant in a stationary equilibrium-. Assume that agents 
can hold either one unit of money or one promise -but not both simultaneously- 
or nothing and a promise -like money- is indivisible . The assumption that agents 
cannot hold simultaneously money and promises and the fact that creditors stay 
out of exchange implies that the number of creditor is the same as the number of 
debtors: C  =  D. The stationarity condition is
<r(l — M  — C)xP = a M x D
The LHS is the inflow of debtors: cr(l — M  — C)x  is the probability for a producer 
to meet a producer that is not going to issue a promise and P  is the number of 
producers. The RHS is the outflow of debtors: a promise gets repaid when a debtor 
acquires money, which happens with probability crMx. He then visits his creditor 
and redeems his promise.
5 This is due to avoid the problem that in a random matching model two individuals may not 
meet again.
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The value functions in a stationary monetary equilibrium with credit will be:
rVm = cr(l -  M  -  D)x  (u(qm) +  Vp -  Vm) -f aD x  (u(qd) +  Vp -  Vm)
rV; = a ( l - M - C ) x { u { q c) + Vd - V ; )
rVc = a M x ( V m - V c)
rVp = 0
rVd = 0
The first equation describes money holders and is interpreted as follows. Money 
holders can consume if they meet a producer, which happens with probability a(l  — 
M  — D )x , or a debtor with probability aDx.  In the two cases the quantity exchanged 
is different and is given by two different take-it-or-leave-it conditions. The second 
one concerns the issuers of promises. With probability a( l  — M  — C)x  they meet the 
producer of their consumption good, they issue a promise and become debtors. The 
third equation gives the value for creditors. They stay out of exchange and wait 
for their debtor to acquire money -which happens with probability a M x -, come 
back and swap money for the promise. The fourth equation is the value to a pure 
producer which is zero by the take-it-or-leave-it assumption. The fifth equation gives 
the value for a debtor. A debtor is a producer who wants to acquire money as soon 
as possible to repay his debt and get back his consumption tool to start consuming 
again. The value is zero by the take-it-or-leave-it assumption.
An equilibrium with money and credit has money holders wanting to give up 
money for consumption
Qm) “1" Vm ^  0 
promise issuers gaining a positive surplus
u(Qc) +  Vd -  >  0
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and creditors accepting the repayment if
vm>vc
Define R  =  r /ax.  The main result shows that there exist values (R, M)  such 
that for R  < R  and 1 > M  > M  an equilibrium with money and promises exists. 
The conditions for existence of the equilibrium can be interpreted as follows. The 
repayment of a promise is a time consuming activity and the time spent on that 
activity depends on the proportions of money holders, on u  and on x. The higher 
is the number of money holders in the economy, the more efficient is the matching 
technology (a higher) and the higher is the probability of meeting the right producer 
(x higher) the easier is for a debtor to find money and repay the promise. Finally a 
smaller r (agents axe more patient), reduces the time cost that a debtor experiences 
until he regains the consumption tool. All these features make the life of a debtor 
easier and thus promote the issue of promises. The reason why people use promises 
even though it is an ” inferior”6 means of exchange is that not everyone has money 
(1 > M ) . Promises sell at a discount compared to fiat money. This can be inter­
preted as a difference in rates of return. The nominal price of a promise is ^  since 
a promise costs qc units of goods and sells at a price Define the interest rate p 
as
1 =  e'*'
\QmJ
where tr is the random time to maturity of the promise. Another equivalent way 
of writing this expression is
since qm > qc in equilibrium, for any finite maturity tr , the interest rate will be
6In the sense that credit is costly in terms of the time needed to repay it. In a monetary trade, 
on the contrary, debt is discharged immediately.
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positive in equilibrium. The rate of return on money, on the contrary, is zero in 
equilibrium since money costs qm and sells at Qm
Finally it can be easily shown that for R  sufficiently small welfare is higher in 
the economy with promises than in the economy with only money. Some agents buy 
with money, other agents buy with credit and repay with money. This is the paper 
that comes closer to set out an idea of complementarity between money and credit.
Local Interaction o f M oney and Credit
Jin and Temzelides (2001) explore a different reason why money and credit may 
coexist. Their model connects the use of credit to frequent exchange and money to 
infrequent exchange. They modify a standard random matching model to allow for 
local matching in the sense that neighboring agents are more likely to meet than far 
away agents. The unit circle is divided into a large number of arcs of equal length 
which can be interpreted as villages. Two assumptions play a crucial role. The 
probability of meeting someone from the same village is high and the probability 
of meeting someone from different villages decreases with the distance between the 
villages. Suppose there are K  villages, ordered according to the increasing distance 
from village 0. The probability to meet agents from each village is decreasing in the 
distance <7o > <Ji >  <72 > ••• > <Jk - Matching probabilities are perfectly correlated 
across agents in the same village. Inside each village there is a record keeping 
technology to monitor the trading history of agents living in the village but not 
agents living in different villages. For simplicity, assume that agents exchange one 
unit of the good for one unit of money and quantities need not to be determined. 
Let also ctm be the sum of the matching probabilities of the villages whose agents 
use money in meetings with agents from the same village, while -with an abuse of 
notation- ao denotes the sum of the matching probabilities of the villages whose 
agents use credit in meetings with agents from the same village. Define u the utility
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of consuming one unit of a good and c the cost of producing it. The value functions 
for credit trade for a producer and a consumer are respectively
Vp = (ao + <jjk) [x (u — c) + pVp] + cm  [xM ( - c +  pVc) +  (1 -  xM )  PVP] 
Vc =  (cto +  Gk) [x (u - c )  + PVC] +  <xm  [x (1 -  M) (u +  pVp) +  (1 -  x  (1 -  M)) PVC]
where the first is the value function for a producer meeting people from his own 
village and exchanging with credit, meeting agents from village k and exchanging 
with credit and producing for money with agents from his own village. The second 
value function represents an agent consuming with money when meeting agents from 
his own village.
The value functions in autarky, i.e. without exchange in meetings with agents 
living outside the village, for a producer and a consumer are respectively:
VP = (cro) [x (u -  c) +  pVp] +  v m  [xM (- c  4- pVc) + (1 -  xM ) pVp] +  akpVp 
Vc = ((T o) \x {u -  c) +  PVC]+(TM [x (1 -  M){u  + pVp) +  (1 -  x  (1 -  M)) pVc]+CTkPVc
In order to have credit transactions between two distinct villages at a distance 
k, the following incentive conditions must be satisfied
- c  + pVp > pVp
-C + PVC>PVC
i.e. it has to be that both a producer and a consumer are better off exchanging with 
someone from village k than exchanging only with agents from their own village.
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Taking the difference
VT)- V D = VC- V C= GkX ~Vc ( 1 - / 3 )
it can be seen that the incentive conditions axe satisfied if
c ( l - j 3 )  _
° k > J ^ 7 ) = ak
Consider now the set of villages matched with the generic village j  with proba­
bility less than cr* and call it B.  Define ctb =  ^  &k for Gk <&k- The value functions
k
for producers and consumers trading with money axe respectively
%  =  (1 -  <7b ) [x («  -  c) +  /svjl +  a B [ x M  ( —c +  0VC~) +  (1 -  x M )  /3kJ
Vc =  (1 -  c t b )  [ x  ( u  -  c) +  /3VC] +  ° B  [x (1 -  M ) ( u  +  +  (1 -  x  (1 -  Af))
where the first is the value function for a producer using credit in a meeting with 
an agent from a sufficiently close village and using money with others. The second 
is the value function for a consumer using credit with an agent from a sufficiently 
close village and using money with others.
For the monetary equilibrium to exist it has to be that a money holder wants to 
use money
—c +  /3VC > /3Vp
Solving the value functions and plugging them in the incentive condition, it gives
c (l 0) _
GB > /3x (1 — M)  (u — c)
To summarise the discussion. Trade between villages that are matched with 
probability higher than use credit and if <75 > <7 # the remaining transactions are
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monetary. The higher is the probability to meet frequently a trading partner the 
higher is the incentive to trade on credit. Money serves to trade with strangers.
Enduring Relationships
A related recent model emphasizes further the role of enduring relationships. Sup­
pose -as in Corbae and Ritter (2004)- that some double coincidence is possible: 
conditional on the event that i wants to consume what j  produces, y is the probar 
bility that j  wants to consume what i produces. Agents can choose to stay together 
and produce for each other until a breakdown of their technology happens and they 
become unable to produce unless they abandon the partnership. The breakdown 
occurs with probability £/2a. Suppose first that money is not available. In this case 
agents are either in search or in a double coincidence meeting, call them potential 
producers (P) and creditors (C ). They exhaust the entire population: P  +  C  =  1. 
The outflows and inflow are stationary if
The value function for an agent in a double coincidence meeting and an agent in 
search are respectively
In a double coincidence meeting the agent consumes and produces until the part-
xy  he finds a new partner.
The following incentive condition must be satisfied in an equilibrium with credit 
and no money:
(C  — xyP  = 0
rVc = a { u - c )  + C(Vp - V c)
rVp = xy(Vc - V p)
nership breaks down in which case the agent starts searching and with probability
(1.2)
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i.e. staying in the partnership must be better than walking away. 
Solving for the equilibrium:
i
P  =
1 +  f
Vr_ =
XXj_
c  — l + f
a (u — c) (r +  xy ) 
r (r +  C +  xy)
v  =  a ( u - c ) (xy) 
p r (r +  C +  xy)
From (2), provided  ^ >  c a symmetric steady state credit equilibrium
exists. The following step involves showing that an equilibrium with money and 
credit exists. The logic to show the existence of a coexistence equilibrium is very 
similar and I will not go into the details here. The striking feature is that the 
introduction of money might be bad for the functioning of the credit economy since 
it reduces the incentives to stick to an enduring relationship. On one hand, money 
is useful since it allows agents to trade when there is only single coincidence; on the 
other it is armful because it dilutes the incentive to remain in a double coincidence 
meeting. This feature stresses once more the relationship of substitution between 
money and credit.
1.2 .4  P r iv a te  M o n e y  a n d  B a n k s  in  a  M a tc h in g  M o d e l
There is a classic question in monetary theory -dating back at least to Hayek and 
Friedman-. Should the government have the monopoly over the provision of money 
or should private banks be allowed to issue banknotes? The Free Banking Era in 
the US before the Civil War, Canada prior to 1935 and Scotland in the beginning 
of the nineteenth century axe historical examples of private provision of money. The 
renewed interest is connected to the recent developments in payment system tech­
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nologies, like stored-value cards, providing close substitutes for currency. Williamson 
(1999) analyses the former question in a search model with a bank.
A search m odel w ith a bank
At the start of the period each agent can be in the search sector -where goods are 
exchanged- with probability 7r or in the banking sector with probability 1 — 7r. When 
in the banking sector, the agent can fund an investment project, which is indivisible 
and needs an injection of q units of goods to begin. After funding an investment 
project, the agent is given an indivisible and portable banknote, which is a claim to 
the investment made. The banknote can be redeem at any time. When the banknote 
is returned to the bank the investment project backing it is interrupted. The agent 
then receives p units of consumption good and consumes them. Agents can hold one 
unit of money, one banknote or nothing but they cannot hold simultaneously money 
and banknotes. Finally and crucially, when in the banking sector agents cannot 
contact each other and trade. This prevents to organize a centralized market place, 
which would destroy the possibility of using money. The structure of the search 
sector is the same as before. The only change is in the source of randomness. In this 
model matching is directed instead of random, in the sense that an agent wanting to 
consume always meets an agent who produces his consumption good. Randomness 
is however still present, being embedded in preferences. Every period, each agent 
wants to consume with probability 1 / 2 . Agents maximize
00 /  1 \ *£°E(tT7 ) { 8 t u { q t ) -t=0 '  /
where 0* 6  {0,1} and Pr [(St =  1] =  Pr [0f =  0] =  1/2.
Among each type at any point in time there will be P  agents not holding any 
asset, B  agents holding banknotes and M  money holders. Terms of trade are deter­
mined through bargaining. Consumers have all the bargaining power.
CHAPTER 1. M ONEY AND CREDIT IN  M ONETARY ECONOMIES 37
The Bellman equations determining the value functions will be
rVm =  ? £ ( u ( q m) + Vp - V m) 
rVb =  u(qb) + Vp - V b) + ^ - ( u ( p )  + Vp - V b) 
rVp = 0
The first equation describes a money holder. When he is in the search sector 
(with probability 7r) and meets a producer willing to produce (with probability 
he consumes and becomes a producer. In the banking sector he gets zero since he 
already has money and he cannot simultaneously hold a banknote.
The second equation gives the value for a banknote holder. In the search sector he 
can consume -with probability using the banknote and then become a producer. 
In the banking sector if he is willing to consume he turns the banknote in, he is given 
p to consume and becomes a producer. Finally the producer gets zero by the take- 
it-or-leave-it conditions.
For an equilibrium with money and banknotes to exist, the following incentive 
conditions have to be verified.
Money holders want to give up money for consumption
^(^m) T Vp Vm >  0
Banknote holders want to give up their banknote for consumption
u(Qb) +  Vp -  Vb > 0
A banknote holder should get a positive surplus from redeeming a banknote
U(P) + V p - V b >  0
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A banknote holder is indifferent -after redeeming his note- between funding a 
new project and having a new banknote or holding no assets.
V b - q - V p 
Solving the system of value functions:
7TP
~TU[qm)
^ u ( g b) +  u(p)
t f  + ^ T + r  
0
and from the take-it-or-leave-it conditions:
7rP
Qm =  v P * , u (.Qm)^  + r
+  ^ - u ( p )
qt =
By inspection the first incentive condition is immediately verified. The fourth 
implies that q = q^ . A solution is found by solving the following equation
TT “ (®) +
subject to the second and the third incentive condition. These constraints can 
in turn be rewritten as
( z P + r )  z E
—TTJ u( l) >  u(p) > f* p 2,— (Jr + r)
thus providing upper and lower bounds for p. A solution can be easily shown to 
exist and to imply q = q^  > qm. To summarise there exist (p, p) ^>0 such that for
Vm =
Vb =
Vp =
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p< p < p, a monetary equilibrium with private banknotes exists.
Two aspects are worth emphasizing. The first is that the upper and lower bounds 
on p are easily understood as a consequence of the way the investment takes place 
and yields returns. If p is too small the investment offers a low return and agents 
will never want to hold banknotes. If p is too high the returns of the investment 
are so high that agents will never want to give a banknote away for consumption in 
the search sector. In equilibrium q = qb> qm• This implies that banknotes sell at a 
premium with respect to money since they have a redemption value -being backed 
by a productive investment- while money doesn’t have any.
To give an answer to the question whether money should be public or private, 
a maximization of social welfare is solved. In the present framework the result is 
unambiguously in favor of private money. Defining welfare as the sum
W  = PVp +  BVb +  MVm
and using the equilibrium value functions, since B  = 1 — P  — M  and Vb > Vm, it’s 
easily seen that welfare is decreasing in M.
This shouldn’t be surprising since private money has the advantage over public 
money of being backed by productive investment activities and no other disadvan­
tages. In this model private money can accomplish the same role as fiat money as a 
medium of exchange and unlike money can promote productive investment.
Private Money, Lemons and Counterfeiting
In more elaborate models some of the inefficiencies of private money can be ana­
lyzed. In particular the literature has focused on the lemons problem and on the 
possibility of counterfeits -as in Williamson (2001)-. The first approach is very sim­
ilar to the previous one except that investment projects are assumed to be of two 
ex-ante unknown qualities: good and bad. A good project requires an investment qg
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and yields a return Rg, while a bad project requires an investment % and yields a 
return R& with qg > and Rg > Rf,. There are two types of banks, one specialized 
in good projects and one in bad projects. The same structure as in the case without 
private information is preserved. There may exist multiple equilibria: there is one 
equilibrium with only good projects backing notes, one with only bad projects and 
one with a mix of good and bad projects. For some parameter values, the only equi­
librium is the one with bad projects. From a welfare point of view, the equilibrium 
with both money and private notes is never superior to an equilibrium with only 
notes or only money. When the letter is superior, a ban on the circulation of private 
banknotes can be justified.
When the possibility of counterfeiting, in the sense of creating a banknote not 
backed by a productive investment, is taken into account and there is a cost of 
counterfeiting a banknote, it is shown that if counterfeiting is sufficiently easy it 
may be better to ban the private issue of notes, since the equilibrium may involve 
the circulation of counterfeits only, which have no welfare improving role.
The Suffolk Banking System, in place in New England between 1824 and the 
Civil War had a clearing arrangement to redeem notes. Temzelides and Williamson 
(2001) analyse this case. There is no public money. The main objective of the paper 
is to compare the behavior of different banks when different circulating private notes 
coexist. There are two banks and two groups of people living in two separate regions. 
The model can be thought of as a decoupling of previous models in which banknotes 
originating in one region circulate in the other region. It is shown that in the presence 
of a clearing arrangement, notes circulate at par in both regions. Without clearing 
arrangement, notes from one region circulate at a discount in the other region.
Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1999) construct a model with banks to address 
the question of the instability of a private money system. The presumption is that 
such a system would be plagued by the overissue problem. In the model some agents
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-called bankers- have the right to be members of a clearinghouse. When a banker 
produces for someone, the clearinghouse credits his account with one unit of money. 
When a banker buys goods with money his account is debited by one unit of money. 
A banker can create banknotes when meeting both a non-banker and a banker. In 
both cases the creation of a note is recorded as a debt in the account of the banker. 
The account of each banker cannot go below zero -i.e. reserves of fiat money and 
banknotes should always at least balance- or the membership in the clearinghouse 
is terminated and the banker loses the possibility to issue notes. The question is 
whether the clearinghouse mechanism is sufficient to prevent overissue of banknotes 
and a private banknote system is feasible. If agents are patient enough, the private 
banknote system is stable, not being subject to the overissue problem. If bankers are 
patient enough their incentive to issue a note when their account balance is down to 
zero -which implies immediate consumption but also exclusion from the note issuing 
arrangement- is lower than the incentive to stick to the arrangement. When fiat 
money is sufficiently scarce, welfare is higher with private banknotes. The most 
serious obstacle to the feasibility of a private money system is the ’’lemons” problem 
and not the overissue problem.
1.2.5 M oney, C red it and B ank ing
In a recent paper, Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2004) introduce a banking sector 
in the Lagos and Wright (2000) model with divisible money. A period is divided into 
day and night. During the day a random half of the population can consume and the 
other half can produce. During the night everyone consumes and produces the gen­
eral good. Both markets are competitive. There are also perfectly competitive banks 
offering the possibility to deposit money and take out a loan of money. Through a 
record keeping technology, banks are able to monitor financial transactions. Trade 
on the goods market cannot be monitored. Money is essential to trade on the goods
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market during the day. Agents can commit to fully repay their loans with banks but 
not with other agents7. Before trading, agents can decide to take a loan or deposit 
money at a bank. The sequence of events is as follows. First an agent observes 
whether he will be a consumer or a producer in the morning. If he is a consumer 
he takes out a loan of money, if he is a producer he deposits money at the bank. 
Then the goods market opens and agents trade. In the night all agents trade and 
debtors repay their loans with cash. There is a government injecting money through 
lump-sum transfers. The growth rate of money is given by Mt = (1 +  z) M*_i and 
the inflation rate 7r = z. Due to the fact that agents have quasi-linear utility during 
the night, every agent will end each period with the same amount of money. The 
following period during the day, some agents (consumers) will need money while 
others (producers) won’t. Banks provide a costly way to redistribute money from 
producers to consumers. They perform a role similar to illiquid bonds in Kocher- 
lakota (2003), to be discussed below. During the day, consumption is given by the 
Euler equation
u'(x) =  (1  +  i)c'(x) 
where i is the nominal interest rate and the interest factor by
The equilibrium with money and banks is sub-optimal but it improves upon the 
equilibrium with only money. Consumption is decreasing in the inflation rate and 
the Friedman Rule implements the first best outcome.
Credit -implemented through a limited record keeping technology- allows money 
to be redistributed from agents not needing it to agents in need of it.
Other papers introducing banks in the matching models include Faig (2004) and
7 The paper deals also with the case without commitment and the possibility of default.
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He, Huang and Wright (2003). In the former, agents can deposit money and take 
loans from banks and use them when trading with trading partners whose history 
can be monitored. When trading with strangers who cannot be easily monitored, 
deposits can be made transferable only at a cost. This creates a role for money. 
Money and credit compete as media of exchange in trades among strangers. In 
equilibrium, money specializes in small ticket items, credit in large ones. In the 
latter paper, banks have the role of accepting deposit to keep money safe from theft. 
Money and deposits compete as media of exchange.
1.2 .6  B on d s in  th e  M atch ing  M odel
A related question -dating back to 1935, when Hicks wrote his ”Suggestion for simpli­
fying the theory of money”- concerns the coexistence of money and bonds. Aiyagari, 
Wallace and Wright (1996) construct a matching model of money where agents use 
indivisible bonds. Agents can use fiat money and interest-bearing securities as alter­
native media of exchange. These nominal, bearer and safe securities are introduced 
in the following way. There is a proportion G of government agents that take part 
into the exchange process in an exogenously specified way. When an agent with a 
unit of money meets an agent willing to produce for him, trade happens. A govern­
ment agent, with probability 7r, offers a two period pure discount bond and destroys 
his own money. At maturity a private agent holding a bond can exchange it for one 
unit of money. Before maturity government agents can however refuse to redeem the 
bond with probability r. The cumbersome way chosen to introduce bonds is meant 
to guarantee that the total amount of asset is unchanged in the economy. The prob­
ability of rejection is crucial to obtain a discount on securities. There are two types 
of stationary equilibria with money and circulating bonds. In the first, matured 
securities exchange at par and not-yet-matured securities exchange at a discount if 
and only if r > 0 ; in the second, matured securities exchange at a discount and
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not-yet-matured securities exchange at less than matured securities.
Coexistence of money and bonds is obtained since government agents discrimi­
nate against not-yet-matured bonds (the probability r with which they are refused 
is positive) and bonds are indivisible. These features can be interpreted as forms of 
legal restrictions on the circulation of bonds.
1.3 Spatial Separation
In this section I will examine two different models with spatial separation giving rise 
to the use of money and to some form of coexistence of money and credit. I will 
use the terminology adopted by Townsend (1980) and call the two models the Turn­
pike Model and the Cass-Yaari Model respectively. While in the matching model 
of money markets are absent and agents meet at random, here there are compet­
itive markets for the exchange of commodities but they are spatially separated or 
incomplete and money serves to transfer value from one market to the next. The 
assumptions on the limitations of commitment and the absence of a record keeping 
technology are again crucial to obtain a role for money. Overall the central idea in 
this literature is that money serves to facilitate trade among strangers -agents know­
ing little about each other- while credit mediates exchange between agents that can 
be monitored. In the last part of the Section, I will analyse models of payment 
systems and finally the coexistence of money and illiquid bonds.
1.3.1 M o n ey  in  th e  Turnpike M od el
The economy is populated by a countably infinite number of agents, each living 
forever. There is an infinite turnpike with two lanes running in opposite direction: 
east and west. Agents are split between those living on one side of the turnpike 
and those living on the other side traveling eastward and westward respectively. 
Each period they travel exactly one mile, stop, trade with the agent traveling on the
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opposite lane and then resume their itinerary. It is a pure exchange economy and 
each agent is alternatively endowed with one unit or zero units of the only good in 
the economy. When two agents meet, one and only one has an endowment of the 
good. Agents have preferences given by a strictly increasing, strictly concave and 
differentiable utility function u(x), with u'(0) =  oo and discount the future at a rate
P-
There is no role for credit, since two agents meet only once in their lifetime and 
there isn’t any record keeping technology. There is an amount M  of money in the 
economy. Define the price of the good in terms of money as p. In recursive form 
the problem for a representative agent of type A starting with no endowment and 
m  units of money will be
V A(m) =  max u(xA) +  (3u(xA) +  (32V A(m')
x,m'
s.t. ml = m  + pr — pxA — p'xA 
m ' > 0
The Euler equation for an agent of type A is
/3u'(xa ) = u'{x£)
Analogously for a representative agent of type B starting with one unit of the 
good and no money
u'(x f ) =  Pu'(x2 )
Market clearing requires
x i +  x i = 1
x A +  X2 = 1
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The solution of the four equations gives consumption in the monetary equilib­
rium. Clearly the equilibrium is inefficient, since efficiency requires equality of the 
marginal rates of substitution. First best can be however attained by an activist 
monetary policy in which the gross rate of deflation is equal to the discount factor: 
z = P, the Friedman rule. Money is thus used to transfer value from one market to 
the next and it has a role in mediating intertemporal trade.
C oexistence o f M oney and Credit
Townsend (1980) shows that by converting the turnpike into a circle opens the 
possibility for agents to exchange promises, since they can now meet again in the 
future and their promises can be repaid. The model, however, pointed to some 
difficulties in deriving an equilibrium with promises whose existence is guaranteed 
only when some exogenous bound on the amount of promises issued is imposed. The 
model moreover left open the question of the coexistence of money and credit. In 
a similar setting Townsend and Wallace (1982) have shown that private securities 
may emerge and circulate in order to facilitate intertemporal exchange. They show 
that circulating private debt often generates a coordination problem, in the sense 
that the amount of debt issued has to satisfy restrictions not implied by individual 
maximization and market clearing alone.
A different idea was explored by Ireland (1994) and Manuelli and Sargent (1992). 
They modified slightly the previous setting to introduce credit and obtain coexis­
tence between money and credit. Suppose that agents, instead of moving every 
period to the next location, are allowed to remain in the same location for two pe­
riods. Agents will use private securities to trade during the period in which they 
stay in the same location and money to connect one trading session to the next. 
Lengthening the trading session improves welfare and in the limit -i.e. when agents 
stay always in the same location- first best is reached: if agents are allowed to stay
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in the same location for ever, the model effectively becomes an Arrow-Debreu model 
with complete markets.
Chatterjee and Corbae (1996) add costly commitment to the model. Each of an 
infinite number of locations is inhabited by N -h i  types of infinitely lived households. 
There are two members in each household a producer and an accountant. During a 
period three sub-periods can be distinguished. In the first sub-period the producer 
is moved to a new randomly chosen location, while the accountant stays at the old 
location. In the second sub-period, the producer can produce goods, enter into con­
tracts -i.e. issue promises- with other agents and ship goods back to his old location 
where the accountant still resides. In the third sub-period the accountant joins the 
producer in the new location. Promises can now be issued since the producer can 
costlessly ship goods back to the accountant. The problem is that the accountant 
doesn’t have any incentive to keep the promise since he will never meet the creditor 
again. With a record keeping technology an equilibrium with both money and credit 
exists. Eliminating money may improve welfare.
1.3.2 M on ey  in  th e  C ass-Y aari M od el
In the turnpike model money acts as a store of value rather than a medium of ex­
change. In the Cass-Yaari model, money acts as a medium of exchange. There axe a 
countably infinite number of households and a countably infinite number of perish­
able commodities. Each household, living forever, consists of a pair of agents and is 
located on a line, one household per integer. Household i cares about consumption 
of commodity i and i + 1 only. Each period an household receives an endowment 
of one unit of good i. Each member is able to travel one half of the distance to the 
adjacent integers where there are the markets for the exchange of good i and i +  1 
(to the right) and good i and i — 1 (to the left). The construction generates absence 
of double coincidence of wants and spatial separation which make money essential as
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a medium of exchange. Members of Household i have preferences given by a strictly 
increasing, strictly concave and differentiable utility function u(xi , X{+1), with indif­
ference curves asymptotic to the axes and discount the future at a rate (3. Promises 
in this economy will not be used since agent i has nothing to offer agent i -H 1 in 
order to repay the promise and there is no record keeping technology. Suppose there 
is a certain amount M  of money in the economy and define the price of the good in 
terms of money as p , then in recursive form the problem for a representative agent 
will be
V(m)  =  max u(x\ ,X2) +  PV{m')
x ,m '
s.t. ml = m + p  — px i — px  2 
m  > px  2
The Euler equation is
du(x i ,g 2) _  du(xi, x2) 
dx2 dxi
Market clearing requires
xi + x 2 = 1
The equilibrium is inefficient, since efficiency requires equalizing the marginal 
rates of substitution. First best can however be reached by the Friedman rule: 
z = p. Money here has the role of an intratemporal medium of exchange.
C oexistence o f M oney and Credit
Imagine to convert the line into a circle, preserving the remaining part of the model. 
Suppose also -along the lines of Bernhardt (1989)-that each period a shock hits 
the economy and households are relocated to different points on the circle. The
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new setting permits the exchange of promises since two trading partners will meet 
at some point in the future with their role reversed: agent i meets i +  1, makes a 
purchase on credit -issuing a promise-. He will repay in the future when he will be 
of type k and his creditor will be of type k — 1. The arrangement is sustained by 
bilateral punishments for reneging on a promise -i.e. if i reneges, i -f 1 will never 
produce for him again-. If the economy is not too big -i.e. the number of types is 
not too high- and the probability of meeting again is sufficiently high, promises will 
circulate in the economy. The model creates room for a promise to be used as a 
medium of exchange, but doesn’t generate coexistence of money and credit unless 
consumption shocks are added. In a sufficiently large economy and for a sufficiently 
large consumption shock, agents first use money to purchase and then issue promises. 
If agents urgently need to consume, they try to issue large promises. This increases 
the incentive to renege, making the equilibrium with promises collapse. The use 
of money reduces the incentives to renege and it allows trade to happen. The 
result point to the fact that in small communities trade is mainly organised on a 
credit basis, while in large communities of strangers -who will probably never meet 
again- money is instead the medium of exchange. Once again the idea that credit is 
associated to frequent relationships, while money to infrequent trades is exploited. 
In the following chapter, I will propose a model of coexistence of money and credit 
that resembles a Cass-Yaari economy but it is based on the availability of collateral 
and explores the idea of the complementarity between money and credit.
1.3 .3  P aym en t sy stem s
Consider a model with spatial separation -as in Temzelides and Williamson (2000)- 
in which there is a countable infinity of locations. Each location is inhabited by a 
representative household with two members a producer and a shopper. Household i 
consumes commodity i and produces i+1. Production of y units of a commodity cost
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c(y) and the cost function is increasing convex and twice continuously differentiable. 
First, shoppers leave their home locations and travel to the next location, then 
production takes place, agents trade and shoppers return home. There are three 
types of households: each type is unproductive in one period, type 1 is unproductive 
in periods 0,3,6..., type 2 is unproductive in periods 2,5,8..., and type 3 in periods 
1,4,7... The structure makes sure that people cannot barter or exchange promises. 
Trade can take place using money or taking part in a centralized payment system. 
When agents are not taking part in a payment system the problem for an agent 
unproductive in period one will be
Vi(mi) =  max u(x i) +  (3 V2{m2)
s.t. p\X\ < mi
m 2 = mi — pixi
In period two the agent can consume and produce
V2 (m2) = max u(x2) -  c (7/2 ) +  PV3 (m3)
s.t. P2X2 < m 2 
m 3  =  m 2  — P2X2 +  P2IJ2 
In period three he can only produce
^3 ( ^ 3) =  max - c ( t/3 ) + (3Vi(mi)
S.t. 7711 =  7713 + ^ 32/3
The equilibrium will exhibit price dispersion and the allocation will not be effi-
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cient, since two cash in advance constraints are involved. When a centralized pay­
ment system is in place with settlement on net at the end of each period, the cash 
in advance constraint in the second sub-period is relaxed, average money holdings 
are reduced and there is a welfare improvement. When an agent is simultaneously 
producing and consuming, he can use current receipts to finance current expendi­
tures and settle on net at the end. The way to achieve efficiency is to relax also 
the first cash in advance constraint. This can be done if the payment system oper­
ates account balances -without settlement at the end of each period- at an interest 
rate equal to /?. Alternatively the Central Bank could operate a system of daylight 
overdrafts at zero nominal interest rate financed by the issue of money. In a simi­
lar spatial separation model of money and credit by Williamson (2002), the use of 
private money replaces completely outside money as a medium of exchange.
Green (2003) asks the following question: is inflation going to make money 
inessential, in the sense that people will increasingly make use of alternative pay­
ment arrangements not involving the use of money? In a model in which money 
and credit are substitute, inflation may indeed spoil the acceptability of money. In 
a model, however, in which money serves as a means of payment -to settle debts- 
inflation doesn’t spoil the acceptability of money. Consider for instance the model 
by Freeman (1996). In an OLG economy he considers the role of monetary policy 
when a payment arrangement is in place. Overlapping generations of agents are 
spatially separated and divided between debtors and creditors. Private debts are re­
deemed with money at a central clearing house and there is a market for second hand 
promises. Liquidity problems might arise due to the fact that trips to the clearing 
house are not synchronized and creditors and debtors may not be simultaneously at 
the clearinghouse for redemption. Freeman shows that equilibria with constrained 
liquidity are inefficient and the Central Bank should issue currency temporarily to 
overcome the distortion and attain efficiency. In such a model inflation doesn’t spoil
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the acceptability of money since money is necessary as a means of payment for debt. 
Mills (2004) shows however that in Freeman’s world such a payment system is not 
essential in the sense that there is an alternative payment system not using money 
as a means of payment that implements the same outcome. Too much commitment 
on the part of agents is assumed. To obtain essentiality Mills (2004) introduces in 
Freeman’s model collateralized lending.
1.3 .4  M o n ey  and  Illiquid  B onds
A recent paper by Kocherlakota (2003) deals with the coexistence of money and 
illiquid bonds. The model economy is built in such a way as to give money an essen­
tial role in performing intratemporal exchanges. Agents have different intertemporal 
marginal rates of substitution, being subject to liquidity shocks, in the form of mul­
tiplicative shocks to preferences. This creates a need for further intertemporal trades 
of money that are accomplished using nominal risk-free bonds. A liquid bond -a bond 
that is portable and can be exchanged for goods- wouldn’t serve the purpose since it 
would have the same rate of return as money. Illiquid non-portable bonds command 
a positive rate of return and are essential to insure against liquidity shocks. The 
analogy is with registered bonds issued by the US Treasury. In Kocherlakota’s words 
”if an individual tries to buy apples with a registered bond, transferring ownership 
of that bond requires a lot of resources”. In chapter 4 I introduce a commitment 
technology in the model by Kocherlakota (2003) and show that illiquidity may not 
be enough to guarantee the essentiality of bonds.
1.4 C onclusion
The matching model and spatial separation model of money have contributed greatly 
to improve our understanding of why people use money to lubricate exchange, pro­
viding a framework in which money arises endogenously as a genuine medium of
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exchange. An important limitation in both models was the absence of alternative 
media of exchange. The literature has generated a number of models were coex­
istence of money and credit is possible. Money and credit or money and private 
notes compete as media of exchange and only an imperfection in the functioning of 
credit creates room for the use of money. In these models, money doesn’t serve as 
a means of payment, to settle debts. We do however observe in reality instances 
in which money and credit are complementary and debts are settled with money. 
To see money and credit as substitute or complementary can have implications for 
monetary policy. In the presence of steady inflation if money and credit are substi­
tute, we should expect people to switch to credit in order to avoid the inflation tax. 
In an economy where they are complementary and money is the means of payment, 
the reverse may happen. The following chapter further explores this issue.
Chapter 2
On the Complementarity of 
M oney and Credit
2.1 Introduction
Money performs four main functions. It is a unit of account, a store of value, a 
medium of exchange and a means of payment. The most neglected of these in the 
literature has been the means of payment, i.e. the means to settle debt. Other 
objects can play the role of unit of account, store of value or medium of exchange. 
Only money however acts as the means of payment1.
The aim of the present chapter is to construct a model where money serves as the 
means of payment. To address this issue, an environment is needed where agents use 
both money and credit as media of exchange. In particular, I look at bilateral credit 
-in the form of promissory notes- and show that money is used to settle bilateral 
promises. Money and credit are complementary.
Complementarity between money and credit turns out to have interesting impli­
lnA medium of exchange includes those assets, or claims, whose transfer to the seller will com­
monly allow a sale to proceed. Payment is in some sense final. The most important general function 
of money is to serve as a means of payment." (Goodhart (1989))
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cations for the effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables.
The model features lack of double coincidence of wants and spatial separation. 
When purchasing goods, agents can use fiat money to overcome the absence of double 
coincidence of wants and they can buy on credit issuing bilateral promises.
The lack of double coincidence of wants has been crucial to explain why money 
is useful in lubricating exchange, ever since the works of Menger and Wicksell. 
As seen in the previous chapter, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) constructed a search 
model around the lack of double coincidence of wants to explain the use of money 
as a medium of exchange. In order to make money essential however they had to 
introduce limitations on enforcement and commitment, thus ruling out alternative 
means of exchange as multilateral and bilateral credit. Specifically, they assumed 
that no public memory technology was in place and agents couldn’t commit to 
future actions. Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) studied multilateral credit as an 
alternative medium of exchange, introducing in the Kiyotaki and Wright model a 
public memory technology. In their model multilateral credit -which resembles a 
credit card system- is a claim to future commodities, not to money. In their model 
money and credit are substitute.
In this chapter, I rule out any public memory technology and thus multilateral 
credit. I assume that agents -being endowed with collateral- can commit to keep 
their bilateral promises. Repayment is decentralized and it requires time. Markets 
are walrasian and money is durable and perfectly divisible. I drop the assumption, 
typical of the search theory of money, that agents meet at random and assume that 
agents can choose their itineraries: this allows me to avoid restrictions on money 
holdings and study an economy with general portfolios of money.
I assume that a day is divided in three periods of eight hours. Each period can 
be used to either consume, produce or rest. After producing, agents need to rest 
for eight hours during which they will not be able to consume or produce. This
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Morning 
Buy with 
Money & 
Credit
Afternoon 
Sell for 
Money &
Credit 
Repay
Figure 2.1: Life of an Agent
assumption captures in a simple, deterministic way a time mismatch between the 
arrival of liquidity and of consumption or production opportunities, inducing agents 
to hold money for some time before being able to spend it.
In equilibrium each agent uses both money and bilateral credit to exchange 
commodities and bilateral credit is repaid with money. The typical life of an agent 
in the economy is summarized in Figure 1. In the morning, agent 1 is on his island, 
where he purchases commodities with money and promises. Then he travels to 
island 2 together with his creditor. In the afternoon he produces for money, repays 
his debt and produces for promises becoming a creditor himself. Then he travels 
with his debtor to island 3 and in the evening -his period of rest- he waits for his 
debtor to repay. Finally he travels to island 1 with money and the next morning the 
cycle restarts. Output and welfare are higher than in the corresponding economy 
without bilateral credit.
Travel with 
Money
Evening
Rest
Repaid
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The model generates interesting predictions on the effect of anticipated inflation 
on macroeconomic variables. Anticipated inflation drives up the nominal interest 
rate, which makes costly to hold promises of future money. The elasticity of the 
nominal interest rate to inflation is greater than one and thus the real interest rate 
increases with inflation. The credit to money ratio and the credit to output ratio 
decrease with inflation. An agent holding a promise will get final payment with 
money in the future. He will then have to hold money overnight before spending it 
to purchase goods. With inflation the opportunity cost of holding money is higher: 
the agent will reduce his holdings of promises of money. In a recent paper, Green 
(2003) argues that inflation may destroy the acceptability of money in a model where 
debt is not settled with money, but not in a model where money serves as the means 
of payment. Here I go one step further, arguing that inflation may harm credit. The 
nominal interest rate is more than unit elastic with respect to inflation and thus the 
real interest rate increases with inflation. The failure of the Fisher effect is due to 
the time mismatch between the arrival of liquidity and consumption opportunities: 
in an environment with inflation some agents hold money for one period. Output 
and welfare decrease with inflation. Inflation, harming credit, reduces the amount of 
transactions performed and thus reduces output. Interestingly, the negative effect 
of inflation on output emerges for high enough inflation rates. In Tobin (1965) 
anticipated inflation induces agents to substitute in their portfolios capital for money 
thus increasing the capital stock and output and decreasing the real interest rate. 
In the literature this is known as the Mundell-Tobin effect. My model generates a 
reverse Mundell-Tobin effect2: credit and output decrease with inflation, the nominal 
interest rate is more than unit elastic in inflation and therefore the real interest rate 
increases with inflation.
Recent empirical analyses highlight three facts consistent with the model:
2 In a different model Stockman (1981) derived similar predictions.
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1. there is negative correlation between inflation and private credit (Boyd, Levine 
and Smith (2001))
2. there is negative correlation between inflation and output for high enough 
inflation (Bullard and Keating (1995); Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (2002))
3. the nominal interest rate is not unit elastic in the inflation rate (Koustas and 
Serletis (1999))
Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001), in particular, find evidence of a negative rela­
tionship between financial activity and inflation, using both cross-country and panel 
data. Their measure of financial activity is private credit to GDP. As for the second 
fact: "There is now a substantial body of evidence indicating that sustained -and, 
therefore, likely predictable- high rates of inflation can have adverse consequences 
either for an economy’s long-run rate of real growth or for its long-run level of real 
activity." (Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001)). Bullard and Keating (1995) show that 
output is decreasing in the inflation rate when inflation is high enough. In a recent 
paper, Stanley Fischer highlights the fact that in high inflation countries credit and 
output have been severely harmed by inflation.
Baumol-Tobin cash management theory is the basis for recent estimates of the 
demand for cash with microeconomic data (Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002)). 
Households choose their money holdings for transaction purposes taking into account 
the cost of transaction time and forgone interest. My model suggests that alongside 
interest rate, time and consumption, debt might have a role in determining agents’ 
demand for cash.
In Freeman (1996), unlike in the present paper, the clearing system is centralized: 
agents need to move to the central island to clear debts. Here the repayment process 
is completely decentralized.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
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3 derives the equilibrium and analyses the impact of anticipated inflation on the 
interest rate, output, the credit to money ratio and welfare. Section 4 discusses the 
results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2.2 T he M odel
Time is discrete and continues for ever. Agents are infinitely lived. They can pro­
duce, consume and rest. There axe N  > 43 islands arranged on a circle, indexed by 
j  = 1,..., N. Each island is inhabited by a continuum of mass three of agents. On 
each island j  one and only one type of perishable commodity (j) can be produced: 
agents j  are the producers of commodity j  +  1 (modulo N). After producing indi­
viduals need to rest for one period: they will not be able to consume or produce 
for one period4. In order to clear the markets, some of agents j  will be consum­
ing in the morning, producing in the afternoon and resting in the evening (type 1), 
some others producing in the afternoon, resting in the evening and consuming in the 
morning (type 2) and finally some resting in the evening, consuming in the morning 
and producing in the afternoon (type 3). There will therefore be eight hours periods 
in a day and agents will do either the morning, afternoon or evening shift. (See 
Figure 2).
To induce absence of double coincidence of wants, I assume that agents j  enjoys 
consuming commodity j  only. Every ordered pair of islands is connected by ships. 
Agents are free to choose their itineraries. On each island competitive markets for 
the exchange of the local commodity open each period, closing at the end of the 
period. When agents arrive on the island they axe randomly matched to a trading 
partner. They can however be randomly re-matched without cost to another trading
3 AT > 4 guarantees that promises cannot be simply swapped instead of being repayed.
4 The cost of consuming or producing without resting is infinite. This assumption can be re­
laxed by having a finite disutility of not resting. Temzelides and Williamson (2001) use a similar 
assumption.
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Day
Evening Morning Afternoon Evening Morning
Type 1 Rest Consume Produce Rest Consume
Type 2 Consume Produce Rest Consume Produce
Type 3 Produce Rest Consume Produce Rest
Figure 2.2: A Day: Height Hours Shifts
partner if they want to. This assumption -together with the fact that there is a 
continuum of agents- keeps the price competitive. At the beginning of time, on each 
island, there is an amount M  of fiat money, in the form of durable and worthless 
pieces of paper. Agents have also the option of issuing their own promises. There is 
no central record-keeping technology to monitor and enforce promises. Each agent 
has an amount of durable collateral specific to him without which he is unable to 
consume5. When issuing a promise, each agent surrenders his collateral to his trading 
partner in exchange for the commodity he purchases. Repayment takes time: the 
issuer of a promise needs to go back to his island, produce and sell in order to gain 
the money needed to make final payment. There is no clearing-house for promises. 
The economy has limited commitment: the commitment power of agents is confined 
to the use of collateral. At all times agents can simply decide not to participate in 
the exchange process. On each island there axe competitive markets for the exchange 
of goods for money (the money market) and for the exchange of goods for promises 
(the credit market).
Agents are characterized by a utility function which I assume to be linear in
5 The utility of consuming without the collateral is zero. Shi (1996) uses a similar assumption.
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consumption
u ( x t , j )  =  x t}j
where x t j  is the quantity bought at time t on island j  and by a cost function -in 
terms of utils- which I assume to be quadratic in the productive effort
c(ytj) = \  (y t j?
where yt,j is the quantity produced by producer j . 6 The objective of an agent of 
type j  is to maximize
X ) 3' Xt j  +  XtJ ~  (%+lj+l +  Vt+lj+l)'
teT
where T  =  {1,4,7,...} in order to take into account the resting period and 0 < (3 < 1 
is the time discount rate, x f j  and x f j  are the quantities of good j  bought at time t 
by agent j  on the money market and on the credit market respectively, while y £ h j+i 
and y^+1j +1 the quantities of good j  + 1 sold for money and for credit. Define the 
price on the money market for good j  at time t as ptj  and the price on the credit 
market as q t j .
2.2 .1  Sequence o f  E vents
Let me first describe the sequence of events informally. For simplicity, suppose there 
are 8 islands. In the Morning agent 1 is on island 1. He spends money to buy his 
consumption good from agent 8. He then increases his purchases issuing bilateral 
promises secured by collateral. At the end of the morning agent 1 and 8 travel 
together to island 27. Meanwhile agent 2 is also coming to island 2. Agent 1 sells
The specific functional forms are not crucial. Quasi-linearity is however crucial to compute the 
solution explicitly.
7 Agents are randomly matched once they arrive on an island. Since there is a continuum of 
agents, a debtor and a creditor may not find each other again. To overcome this problem I make 
them stick together.
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Evening
A fternoon
M orning
7
Mr. I 
M r.2 
M r.8
Figure 2.3: Sequence of Events
goods to agent 2 for money. With the money he got, he repays agent 8 and gets his 
collateral back. He then sells goods to agent 2 for promises, becoming a creditor. 
At the end of the afternoon he travels with agent 2 to island 3. Meanwhile agent 8 
travels to his consumption island. In the evening agent 1 will be resting and waiting 
for repayment. The next morning he will restart the cycle. (See Figure 3).
Formally the sequence of events is as follows. Agent j  at time t uses part or 
possibly all of the money he accumulated in the past (m ^_j) to buy goods on the 
money market
P tjx f t  <
then proceeds to the credit market where he sells a promise dJt to be repaid in the
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future:
qt , j x f j  =  d\
In the following period he produces for money in order to pay off his debt:
P t + i j + i V t + i j + i  =  m 3t+1 >  d \
He is then free to produce for a promise that will be repaid the next day when he 
will follow his debtor on island j  + 2 in order to get his money back:
Q t + i j + i V t + i j + i  =  t f + i  =  m t+ 2
At time t + 2 he receives a lump-sum money transfer from the government. The 
previous sequence of exchanges gives rise to the following budget constraint
7 M C* 7 M C*
m t+ 2 =  P t + h j + i V t + i j + i  +  Q t + i j + m + i j + i  +  m Jt_ x -  P t j x tJ -  q t j x Y j  +  r t+2j  
the cash-in-advance constraint
P tjx ft  < mJt_!
and the repayment constraint
P t+ lj+ 1 2 /t+ U + i >  QtjXtj
which states that the amount of money obtained producing has to be at least enough 
to repay the debt. The repayment constraint embeds the relationship of complemen­
tarity between money and credit in an otherwise fairly standard cash-in-advance 
framework and is going to play a major role in the analysis.
The economy features limited enforcement. Agents -as in Kocherlakota (1998)-
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always have the option to stay home and do nothing. The relevant participation 
constraint states that producing tomorrow for promises and consuming in three 
periods must give non-negative utility:
0t+3 (*1+30 +  *t+3j) -  &t+1\  (vi+i j +i + y?+i j+ i ) 2 >  o
2.2 .2  K ey  A ssu m p tion s
The model features five key assumptions:
1. absence of double coincidence of wants and spatial separation are necessary to 
give money a role as a medium of exchange;
2. absence of a record keeping technology rules out multilateral credit contracts;
3. limited enforcement;
4. collateral makes the exchange of promises possible, giving agents a limited 
form of bilateral commitment power;
5. agents do not always participate in the exchange process: they have to rest 
after producing. Rest is crucial to generate an essential role for credit as a 
medium of exchange.
The model differs from a standard search model in that agents can choose their 
itineraries. This allows me to lift the {0,1} restriction on money holdings, typical 
of the search theory of money, and analyse a model where general portfolios of 
perfectly divisible money can be held. The absence of double coincidence of wants 
alone wouldn’t be enough in my model to induce a role for money as a medium of 
exchange if agents could meet in the same market place and strike multilateral deals. 
Spatial separation of markets prevents multilateral deals.
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The paper focuses on the interaction of money and bilateral credit rather than 
multilateral credit. I therefore rule out all devices that could allow agents to ex­
change multilateral credit contracts. In fact I assume that there isn’t any technology 
allowing agents to keep track of each other. I also rule out any technology that could 
allow agents to commit to future actions other than collateral.
Collateral in the model is individual specific, has no public value and is neces­
sary to consume. The reader can think of a consumption tool as in Shi (1996) or 
alternatively of a blueprint for future production. In the model the borrower leaves 
the collateral with the lender until the debt is repaid. Such form of collateralized 
borrowing is known as a repurchase agreement (repo). The fact that collateral is 
necessary to consume induces agents to repay their promises for sure and rules out 
default .
In the model agents need to rest for one period after producing. This assumption 
captures in a simple way the fact that consumption, investment or production op­
portunities may arise at a different time with respect to the time at which contracts 
come due and agents may thus have to hold money for some time before being able 
to spend it. Temzelides and Williamson (2001) have a similar assumption.
2.2 .3  In d iv id u als
In a symmetric equilibrium individuals choose ( x ^  , x f  ,y^.i,y^+1,mt+2) to solve 
max x t*+  x? - p l ( y t i i  + y?+i)2
t=1,4,... L
S.t. ptX¥  < 77lf_l [At]
P t + m +1 >  q t x ?  M  
m t+ 2 =  P t + i V t + i  +  q t + i V t +1 +  m t - 1 -  P t x } *  -  q t x ?  +  T t + 2 [7t]
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P t+3 (**+3 + *4+3) ^ Pt+1l  (Vt+i + V t+ i f2
together with the transversality condition on money holdings. 
In the interior solution the Euler equations are
1 _  ( i  +  <t>t)P{y?h +  y?+i) (2 .1)
Qt Pt+1
which equates the marginal benefit of consuming on credit to the marginal cost of 
producing tomorrow for money in order to repay and
0 3 _  (l +  & )lO /l+ i + j 'm )  (2.2)
Pt+3 Qt+1
which equates the marginal benefit of consuming with money in three periods time 
to the marginal cost of producing for a promise tomorrow. Define the interest factor 
(1 -f it) =  ^  for all t. Observe that A* > 0 and fit > 0 when (1 +  it) > 1 for all t. 
The binding cash-in-advance constraint is
XM =  (2.3)
Pt
the repayment constraint is
V t l i  =  +  (2-4)Pt+i
the budget constraint
m t + 2 =  Pt+iVt+i +  Qt+iVt+i +  mt - 1 -  P&Y ~  Qtx? +  Tt+2 (2.5)
and the complementary slackness condition for the participation constraint is
<Pt f  (^ 4+3 +  * 4+3) -  (3/4+1 +  Vt+lY =  0 (2 .6)
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with <f>t > 0.
Observe that the Euler equations can be solved together to give the two period 
interest factor
(1 +  it) (1 + it+i) =  "^ 3
0 Pt
Finally as a benchmark consider an economy where credit cannot be used (for 
instance because there is no collateral). In this case the model turns into a cash-in- 
advance model where the repayment constraint and the participation constraint are 
not binding and the solution is
Vtli =
Pt+3
2 .2 .4  T h e  G overnm ent
On each island, the government issues money every period and gives lump-sum trans­
fers to agents in their period of rest8. The government budget constraint equates 
the increase in the money supply on each island to the total transfers to agents:
Mt -  Mt- i  =  Tt
where I dropped the index for the islands since I solve for a symmetric equilibrium. 
The money supply grows at a rate zt :
Mt =  (1 +  zt) M t - 1
81 assume that agents receive transfers only when they are resting in order to rule out redistrib­
utive effects of monetary policy.
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2.3 Equilibrium
2.3 .1  E quilibrium  w ith ou t Inflation
I solve first for a stationary symmetric competitive equilibrium without inflation. In 
such an equilibrium
1. agents maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, the cash-in-advance 
constraint, the repayment constraint, the participation constraint and the 
transversality condition;
2. all markets clear at all times: the goods-for-money market , the
goods-for-credit market x f  — y f ,  the market for money mt =  M*;
3. the Government fulfills its budget constraint and sets zt = 0 (T* =  0) at all 
times;
The system (l)-(6) can be solved in a stationary equilibrium for the one period 
nominal interest factor, for the credit to money ratio, for total output and for the 
multiplier <j>. The interest factor is
(1 +  0  =  4 r
0*
the credit to money ratio is
y °  a*
y M - P '
and equation (1) and (6) determine together output and the multiplier
i =  (i +  <t>) ( i +  0  0  (vM +  vc )
<t>[202 -  (yM + y c )\ = 0
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2
When (3 < (^ )3, the Participation Constraint is binding and total output and 
consumption in the economy are given by
yM + yc  = 2 /32 = x M + xc
2
When (3 > ( ^ )3 the Participation Constraint is not binding and total output 
and consumption are
yM + y C = p i  = XM +  XC
In the monetary equilibrium without credit, total output and consumption would
be
yM =  0* = x M
In equilibrium, each period one third of the population is consuming using both 
money and credit, one third is producing for money and credit and one third is 
resting while repayment takes place. One third of agents j  in the morning - period 
t- are on island j  and trade money for goods. They also issue promises secured by 
the collateral to increase their consumption of good j .  Then they travel to island 
j  + 1. In the afternoon - period £+1- they produce for money and for promises. They 
repay their promise in the afternoon, handing fiat money to their creditors (agents 
j  — 1) who have travelled with them and are waiting on island j  + 1. The collateral 
is returned and promises destroyed. In the evening they leave to island j  + 2 where 
they rest and wait for repayment to take place. Finally they travel to island j  to 
restart the cycle. Money and credit are both media of exchange and money is the 
means of payment.
To show that this is indeed an equilibrium I have to check all the relevant incen­
tive and participation constraint. When an agent is consuming, it is fairly intuitive 
that he does want to use both money and credit since they allow him to transact 
and consume more. When an agent is producing though, several deviations have to
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be considered. First, he may refuse to repay his debt. In this case he will loose his 
collateral, will be unable to consume in the future and will get zero for ever. This 
deviation is thus captured by the participation constraint. Second, he could repay 
his debt, but then produce more for money instead of becoming a creditor. Here 
is where the resting period is playing its technical role. This deviation would be 
particularly attractive if the agent could run away immediately, spend his cash and 
consume. The fact that he is stuck for some time, unable to spend money, induces 
him to become a creditor in order to gain an interest over the resting period. The 
equilibrium interest rate will make him willing to lend.
Consider then the possibility that an agent repays his debt with someone else’s 
promise instead of money. In this case the original issuer of the promise may not 
meet the holder of his collateral again since agents, once they axe on an island, 
are matched randomly and there is a continuum of them9. Agents wouldn’t issue 
promises in the first place and this is enough to rule out the deviation. Notice finally 
that the lack of double coincidence of wants excludes repayment with commodities.
A feature of the equilibrium is that the price on the credit market is higher
3
than the one on the money market: (1 + i) = * = /3~ 2 > 1, i.e. there is rate of 
return dominance. This is necessary for a promise of money-later to be accepted 
instead of money-now. Total production in the economy with credit is higher than 
total production in the economy with only money: ^ 2  > /32and 2/32 > fi2. Credit 
is a valuable medium of exchange that increases the number of transactions. More 
transactions induce agents to consume and produce more compared to an economy 
without credit. The two media of exchange coexist in a fundamental sense: each 
agent uses both at every stage to exchange.
To summarise, credit is repaid with money, there is an endogenous interest rate 
and output is higher than in the corresponding economy without credit.
9Technically it is a zero measure event.
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2 .3 .2  A rrow -D ebreu  E conom y and F irst B est
Suppose for a moment to drop the assumption on the spatial separation of market, 
so that Arrow-Debreu markets can be organized. The maximization problem for an 
agent consuming at time t (type 1) becomes
where p are Arrow-Debreu prices. Call the proportions of agents of each type 
c*1, a 2, a:3 with a 1 +  c? +  a 3 = 3.
In a stationary symmetric Arrow-Debreu equilibrium:
1. agents maximize utility subject to the life-time budget constraint;
To solve for a stationary symmetric equilibrium I will guess that Arrow-Debreu 
prices are given by pt+i = fipt . The budget constraint for agents of type 1 is then
max
s.t. X  Ptx t ^  X  Pt+iVt+i
*=1,4,... t= l,4 ,...
for an agent resting at time t (type 2) it will be
max
*=1,4,... L
S.t. X  Pt+lx t+l ^  X  Pt+2Vt+2
X I & Px t+i - $ 2\  (yt+2 ) 2
t=1,4,...
and for an agent producing at time t (type 3)
max
s:t- X  Pt+2x t+2 < X  Pty*
*=1,4,... *=1,4,...
2. markets clear: otl x l = a 3y3, a 2x 2 = a l y l and a 3x 3 =  a 2y2.
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x1 =  Py1. The solution gives y1 = 1 and x1 =  p. For an agent of type 2 the budget 
constraint becomes x2 =  Py2. The solution gives y2 = 1 and x2 =  (3. For an agent of
type 3, the budget constraint is x 6 = -^ y3 . The solution gives y6 = 1 and x3 = 
The proportions of agents can be computed from the equilibrium conditions. 
These are respectively a 1 =  3/3/ (l +  P + P2) , a 2 =  3 / (l + P + P2) and a 3 =  
3P2/  (l +  P + P2) . Finally, welfare in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is equal to 
9p2/2 (1 +  P +  P2) .
To compute the first best allocation I solve the following problem
,3 _  l
max a x 1 -  p \  (y1)2 + (Y 2\2Px2 - P 2- ( y 2) +  a *■ -  \  (y2)2
s.t. a 1x 1 = oc3y3
2 2 l  ia x = a y
3 3 2 2a x = a y
which gives the allocation x1 =  o?/a l , x 2 = a 1 / a 2, x3 =  ot2/o?  and y1 = y2 =  y3
1. The first best frontier is given by
As expected welfare at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is a point on the first best 
frontier, as it can be easily checked substituting the values for the proportions of 
agents found above.
2 .3 .3  W elfa re
To show that money and credit together can achieve an outcome that is socially 
preferred to the outcome that can be achieved with money alone, I will compare
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welfare in the equilibrium with credit and in the equilibrium without it, taking as a 
measure of welfare the sum of the value functions of the three groups of individuals 
-i.e. consumers, producers and resting agents-.
+  x ^  \  (yM +  y ^ )2 
W  = VC + VT + VT = -----1 V '
is the sum of the value functions of the three groups of individuals in the money and 
credit equilibrium and
W  = VC + Vp + Vr
x M -  i  (yMf  
( 1 - / 3 )
is the sum of the value functions of the three groups of individuals in the money 
only equilibrium.
The difference W  — W  -when P > (5 )®- is
w - w = 2 e i - P  2/32
2(1-13)  2 (1 - 0 )
which is positive for all 0  < /3 < 1 .
The difference W  — W  -when (3 < (^ )5- is
A/32 -  4/34 2/32 -  f34
2(1 -13) 2(1 — P)W - W  =
which is positive for P < (§ )5- Notice that ( | ) 5 > .
Money and credit thus achieve a socially preferred outcome. The combination 
of the two means of exchange allows the economy to move closer to the first best 
frontier, which is however never attained except for P =  1. Money helps credit to 
work providing the means of payment and the use of credit improves output and 
welfare compared to an economy without credit since it allows agents to perform 
more transactions.
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2 .3 .4  E q u ilib r iu m  w ith  A n tic ip a te d  In f la t io n
Next, I solve for a stationary symmetric competitive equilibrium with steady infla­
tion. In such an equilibrium
1 . agents maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, the cash-in-advance 
constraint, the repayment constraint, the participation constraint and the 
transversality condition;
2 . all markets clear at all times: the goods-for-money market x^1 =  , the
goods-for-credit market x f  = y f , the market for money m* =  Mt\
3. the Government fulfills its budget constraint and sets z% =  z  >  0 at all times;
Observe that by money market clearing, the inflation rate 1r is equal to the 
growth rate of money z: 7r =  =  z.
Consider first the case in which the Participation Constraint is not binding, 
which happens when 1 +  7r >
The Euler equations will be
i  =  ^ ^ - ( y M +  y c ) (2 .7)1 +  7T
y M +  y °  =  (2 -8 )
(1  +7T)
where the first equation describes the behavior of a debtor who increases his utility 
in the afternoon borrowing an extra unit (LHS) and will have to repay his debt 
with interest producing an extra unit in the evening (RHS). The second equation
describes the behavior of a creditor who is lending an extra unit in the afternoon
(LHS) and will get repayment with interest in the evening but will be able to spend 
it only the next morning since he has to rest during the night (RHS). There is a 
time wedge between the borrower -who cares about one period ahead- and the lender
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Borrower MB, = 1 MCm  = P ~ y
1 + 7T
Lender
Money
M C , = y Repaid MB t+2 = P
2 1 + i
 1 1 ►
Afternoon Evening Morning
Figure 2.4: Euler Equations
-who cares about two periods ahead, because of the resting period-. The creditor 
is holding money overnight, before being able to spend it. (See Figure 4, where 
y =  yM +  yc  and MB stands for marginal benefit, MC for marginal cost).
The repayment in real terms must be equal to the amount borrowed plus the 
interest discounted by the inflation factor, since debt is repaid one period later:
which, using the equilibrium condition on the credit market, gives the ratio of the 
real demand for promises to the real demand for money.
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Solving (1 ),(2 ) and (3) together the nominal interest rate, output and the credit 
to money ratio are derived. The nominal interest factor is
, l  +  7r \ i1 +  * =
P
total output will be given by
yM + C = l  ( l + J L )  =
0 \ 1 + t )  ( l+7r)2
and the credit to money ratio is
yc  ( l  +  7r\ /?§
yM VI + * /  (1 +  7T)2
When 1 +  7r <  the participation constraint is binding and total output is 
given by:
yM + yc  = 20*
2.3.5 Credit, Output and Real Interest Rate
The credit to money ratio in the economy goes down with inflation since lenders 
have to hold money overnight after repayment takes place
y °  &
ft /  A/ /  .- V 1
y  ( i  +  7r) 2
In turn, the amount of goods sold for credit as a share of output is decreasing in 
the inflation rate
y °  0
y c  +  y M £ §  +  (1 +  ^ )3
At time t a producer in equilibrium holds a claim to future money which will be 
paid off at t + 1 . He will however have to hold money overnight, from t + l  until t +  2
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when he will spend it to buy consumption goods. Inflation drives up the nominal 
interest rate and makes it costly to hold claims to future money: agents reduce their 
credit holdings. (See Figure 5).
Output is decreasing in the inflation rate. Credit increases the amount of trans­
actions which increases output. This can be seen from the Euler equation
where the second equality is obtained using the binding repayment constraint. Higher 
inflation reduces the credit to money ratio and this reduces transactions and the in­
centive to produce. Output and consumption when the participation constraint is
Credit/
GDP
1
 ►
Inflation
Figure 2.5: Inflation harms Credit
CHAPTER 2. ON THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF M ONEY AND CREDIT 78
O utpu t
?2
1/4 f t  Inflation
Figure 2.6: High Inflation harms Output 
not binding are decreasing in the inflation rate
yM + yc = - A —
(1 + 7r)2
while, when the participation constraint is binding, output is insensitive to the 
inflation rate
yM + yC = 2 p2 = x M + xc
Total output increases with the credit to money ratio: more credit allows agents 
to trade more driving up production. Inflation in turn decreases the credit to money 
mix, reducing the incentive to hold future money. Thus inflation reduces output in 
the economy. This however happens only when the inflation rate is sufficiently high 
-i.e. for 1 + 7r > For lower inflation factors output is constant (see Figure 6 ).
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Observe that the real interest factor increases with the inflation rate
(i +r)  = I ± i = ( I ± ^
1 +  7T
The nominal interest factor is more than unit elastic in the inflation factor, with 
elasticity equal to 3/2, and the real interest factor increases with inflation. In the 
model the creditor is bearing the cost of inflation, since he is holding money for one 
period while he is resting. The higher interest rate compensate him for the cost of 
holding money in the presence of inflation. Changing slightly the model, it would 
be possible to make the debtor hold the money for one period. The analysis would 
go through unchanged except for the real interest rate which would be decreasing in 
inflation. In this case it would be the debtor who would have to be compensated for 
holding money in the presence of inflation. What is really crucial is therefore that 
the real interest rate changes with inflation -and thus the nominal interest rate is 
not unit elastic in inflation- rather than the direction of the change. (See Figure 7). 
The mismatch between the arrival of liquidity and of consumption opportunities is 
responsible for the break-down of the Fisher effect.
To summarise, total output decreases, the credit to money ratio decreases and 
the real interest rate increases with fully anticipated inflation.
2.3.6 Welfare
A steady inflation generates a welfare loss, since agents transact, produce and con­
sume less. Welfare, when the participation constraint is not binding, is given by
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Real
In terest
Inflation
Figure 2.7: Inflation increases the Real Interest Factor 
and when the Participation Constraint is binding, by
4P2 -  4/?4W (  7r) =
2 ( l - «
(2 .11)
As a measure of the welfare cost of inflation consider the difference between 
welfare in an economy with inflation and in an economy without inflation: W  (7r) — 
W  (0 ). Observe that (1 0 ) is decreasing in the inflation rate for any 7r > 0
0 2  \fi\ - ( l+ 7 r ) 2
W ' (tt) =  L------------------
2 ( l - ( 5 )  (l + irY
Therefore, welfare with inflation is lower than welfare without inflation. (11) is 
constant and equal to welfare without inflation.
We know that first best output is given by y* =  1. The optimal monetary policy 
would be the Friedman Rule. The government should tax money balances, deflating
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at a rate 7r =  ft — 1 , until the rate of return on money and credit are equalised, 
allowing the distortion due to market incompleteness to be overcome and the first 
best allocation to be reached. However, the Friedman Rule cannot be implemented 
through taxes since enforcement is limited in the economy and agents cannot be 
forced to surrender money to the government.
Output and consumption in the monetary equilibrium without credit would be
~M &2 — My = --------- o  =  x
( 1  -F  7r)
Welfare in the money economy without credit would then be
f  2 ( 1  + i r Y - 0
W  (7 r ) =
2 o2
The economy with credit always performs better than the corresponding econ­
omy without credit. Taking the difference between welfare with credit -when the 
participation constraint is slack- and welfare without credit, I obtain
w M w M (1 + «)* -  p (1 + *)3 -  W2 (! +  + 14
2 (1 —/3)(1 +  tt) 4
which is strictly positive for any 7r > 0. When the participation constraint is binding, 
the difference in welfare is
W  f r )  W  ( t )  -  4/32 (1 +  T)4 ~  4/34 (1 +  T)4 ~  2 0 2  (1 +  T ) 2  +  ^  
2 (1 -  ft) (1 +  w)4
which is positive for any 7r > 0  when (3 < ( | )   ^ .
The model highlights a neglected component of the welfare costs of inflation: 
inflation drives down the credit to money mix in the economy. Production suffers 
from the decrease in credit: welfare is lower.
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2.4 Discussion
Complementarity between money and credit in the model is represented by the 
repayment constraint which is responsible for the effects of inflation on the interest 
rate, on output and on credit. Anticipated inflation gives rise to a reverse Mundell- 
Tobin effect. The nominal interest rate is more than unit elastic in the inflation 
rate and thus the real interest rate increases with inflation, the credit to money 
and credit to GDP ratios decrease with inflation and finally output decreases with 
inflation, when the inflation rate is sufficiently high.
Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) use macroeconomic data to show that anticipated 
inflation has a negative impact on private credit to GDP and interestingly, Bullard 
and Keating (1995) provide evidence of the fact that output is relatively insensitive 
to inflation when inflation is low and decreasing for higher inflation rates. There is 
also evidence that the nominal interest rate is not unit elastic in the inflation rate 
(Koustas and Serletis (1999)). I explore these issues further in the next chapter.
The predictions differ from those found by Gillman (1993) and in similar models 
by Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998) and English (1999). These models modify 
a cash in advance economy a la Lucas and Stokey to allow the representative agent 
to decide which goods to buy with cash and which goods with a costly transaction 
technology that produces credit services. Gillman (1993) shows that "the consumer 
chooses between a foregone-interest cost of cash and a time cost of credit when 
purchasing any one good. Avoiding the inflation tax means switching from fiat 
that uses no resources to exchange credit that uses up societal resources.[...]the 
consumer substitutes away from cash until the marginal cost of avoiding inflation, 
through credit use, equal the marginal inflation tax on cash use". The increase in 
the nominal interest rate makes more costly to hold money. Agents thus switch to 
an alternative -inflation free- medium of exchange. The credit to money ratio and 
credit to output ratio increase with inflation. The nominal interest rate elasticity to
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inflation is equal to one. These papers see money and credit as substitute.
The literature typically identifies the welfare costs of inflation with the resource 
cost of producing transaction services alternative to cash. Resources are diverted 
from production to credit services and welfare is lower. The point is neatly summa­
rized in a recent paper by Lucas (2000): "In a monetary economy, it is in everyone’s 
private interest to try to get someone else to hold non-interest-bearing cash and 
reserves. [...] All of us spend several hours per year in this effort and we employ 
thousands of talented and highly-trained people to help us. These person-hours are 
simply thrown away, wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at all."
In my model, inflation, driving up the nominal interest rate, makes costly to hold 
a promise of money, thus reducing the credit to money ratio which in turn reduces 
transactions, output, consumption and welfare.
The repayment constraint is the driving force of the model and it embeds com­
plementarity. Broadly speaking it says that agents with debt will have to hold cash 
in the future in order to repay. Money demand functions have been estimated on the 
basis of theoretical models of cash management of the Baumol-Tobin type, in which 
consumers -when deciding their money holdings for transaction purposes- take into 
account the cost of transaction time and the forgone interest of other assets. To test 
the Baumol-Tobin model Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) estimate a money 
demand function with time, interest on checking accounts and consumption as ex­
planatory variables. In my model, debt influences cash management decisions by 
households, since debt is paid off with money. Specifically higher debt would induce 
agents to hold more cash, suggesting that debt might have a role in determining 
agents’ demand for cash.
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2.5 Conclusion
The aim of the chapter was to address the issue of the role of money as a means 
to repay debt. I constructed a model with microfoundations for the use of money 
and bilateral credit as media of exchange, where money serves also as the means of 
payment. In equilibrium money and bilateral credit coexist, credit is repaid with 
money and it dominates money in the rate of return: the two assets are complemen­
tary. Complementarity generates a reverse Mundell-Tobin effect: the real interest 
rate increases with inflation, the credit to money ratio and output both decrease 
with inflation.
Chapter 3
On the Elasticity of the 
Nominal Interest Rate
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I constructed a model in which the nominal interest rate 
was more than unit elastic in the inflation rate and thus the real interest rate was 
increasing in inflation. In this chapter, I show that the model can be slightly modified 
to give a less than unit elastic nominal interest rate and thus capture a decrease 
-rather than an increase- in the real interest rate. If the bilateral credit contract 
induces the debtor -instead of the creditor- to hold money overnight, then the interest 
rate will have to compensate him for bearing that cost and the real interest rate 
will decrease with inflation. What is really crucial in the model is therefore that the 
nominal interest rate is not unit elastic and the real interest rate is not independent of 
inflation and not whether it increases or decreases. The mismatch between the arrival 
of liquidity and of consumption opportunities is responsible for the break-down of the 
Fisher effect. The paper by Koustas and Serletis (1999) provides empirical evidence 
that the nominal interest rate is not unit elastic in the inflation rate and thus the
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Fisher effect is not at work. Here I explore the issue of the direction of the change 
in the interest rate.
I then use macroeconomic data on interest rates and inflation between 1993 and 
2003 for 59 countries to estimate the elasticity of the nominal interest rate with 
respect to inflation. To account for the difference in the size of countries and thus 
the informational content of data, I use weighted least square with GDP in 2002 
as a weight. I use GDP in order to have a sound measure of both the size and the 
efficiency of the market. I find that the elasticity of the nominal interest rate with 
respect to inflation is close to 1.4. I also test the prediction on credit/GDP.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2  presents the modification of the model 
and solves for the equilibrium. Section 3 contains the evidence. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 T he M odel
Consider the same model as in chapter 2  with one modification. Assume that there 
exist a technology allowing a creditor and a debtor to keep track of each other -and 
of no one else in the economy-. In this case the following sequence of events can be 
an equilibrium1. In the Morning agent 1 is on island 1 . He spends money to buy his 
consumption good from agent 8 . He then increases his purchases issuing bilateral 
promises secured by collateral. At the end of the morning agent 1 travels to island 
2 . Meanwhile agent 2  is also coming to island 1 . Agent 1 sells goods to agent 2  for 
money. He then sells goods to agent 2  for promises, becoming a creditor. At the 
end of the afternoon he travels to island 8  to meet his creditor. With the money he 
has got, he repays agent 8  and gets his collateral back. In the evening agent 1 is 
resting. The next morning he meets his debtor on island 1 who repays him and he 
restarts the cycle. (See Figure 1 ).
The crucial difference is that now the debtor -instead of the creditor- holds money
lrTo illustrate the point, I take the same -8 islands- example as before.
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Mr.2 
Mr.8
Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events
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for eight hours.
3.2 .1  E quilibrium
The Euler equations2 are
(3.1)
(3.2)
where the first equation describes the behavior of a debtor who is increasing his 
utility in the afternoon by borrowing an extra unit (LHS) and will have to repay 
his debt with interest for two periods producing in the evening (RHS). The second 
equation describes the behavior of a creditor who is lending an extra unit in the 
afternoon (LHS) and will get repayment with interest the next morning -i.e. two 
periods later- (RHS). The debtor is holding money for one period. (See Figure 2, 
where y = yM +  yc  and MB stands for marginal benefit, MC for marginal cost).
The repayment in real terms must be equal to the amount borrowed plus the 
two periods interest discounted by the inflation factor:
which, using the equilibrium condition on the credit market, gives the ratio of the 
real demand for promises to the real demand for money.
Solving (1),(2) and (3) together the nominal interest rate, output and the credit 
to money ratio are derived. The nominal interest factor is
2For simplicity, I ignore the participation constraint. The solution when the constraint is binding 
mirrors the one in the previous chapter.
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Borrower
Lender
M B  = 1 Money
1 +  7V
Repay
M C  = y M B  =  p
Afternoon Evening Morning
Figure 3.2: Euler Equations
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total output is given by
M , C  _  1  1  +  ^  _  P*
y +y ~ + +
and the credit to money ratio is
y c  1 +  7T @ 2
y M ( l  +  i )2 ( i  +  7r)i
3.2 .2  N om in a l and R eal In terest R ate
The credit to money ratio and output are the same as before and thus decreasing in 
the inflation rate.
The nominal interest factor is however now less than unit elastic with respect to 
inflation, with elasticity equal to 3/4, and the real interest factor decreases with the 
inflation rate
(l + r ) =  1 + 4 1
1 + 7 T  / ? 4  ( 1  +  7 r ) 4
In the model the debtor is bearing the cost of inflation, since he is holding money 
for one period while he is resting. The lower interest rate compensate him for the 
cost of inflation. (See Figure 3).
To summarise, total output decreases, the credit to money ratio decreases and 
the real interest rate decreases with the inflation rate.
3.3 E lasticity  o f th e  nom inal interest rate: evidence
To distinguish between the two possible cases -i.e. an elasticity greater or smaller 
than one- I tested the elasticity of the nominal interest rate to the inflation rate 
with macroeconomic data. I use data on 59 countries between 1993 and 2003 on
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Real
In terest
Inflation
Figure 3.3: Inflation decreases the Real Interest Factor
the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate3. I use the Lending Rate -the bank 
rate that meets the short and medium-term financing needs of the private sector 
(International Financial Statistics, line 60p)- as the nominal interest rate and the 
Consumer Price Index - (International Financial Statistics, line 64)- to compute 
inflation rates. I take averages over the period 1993-2003 to concentrate on steady 
state inflation. Some countries experienced, over the last ten years, one year of 
sudden inflation or deflation returning to previous levels afterwards. In those cases 
I regressed the inflation rate against a constant and a dummy for the specific year 
and used the coefficient of the constant as a measure of average inflation. I included
3The 59 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, CostaRica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mex­
ico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, SriLanka, Suriname, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
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only countries that have a C- or better in the Summers and Heston’s ranking on the 
quality of data and countries that have data for the entire period considered. To 
account for the difference in size among countries I use weighted least squares with 
GDP in 2002 for each country as a weight. I use GDP to capture simultaneously 
the dimension and efficiency of the market. The model generates an interest factor 
of the form
u . . l  +  7 r \ °  l  + i =
0
where a is the elasticity. Taking logs I get
log(l +  i) =  -a\og/3 + a lo g (l +  7r)
I therefore estimate the following equation:
log (1 +  i) = 0.035 +  1.381 log (1 +  tt)
(0.002)*** (0.104)***
The coefficients are statistically significant (standard errors are in parenthesis) 
and the R? is 0.982. Using the Wald test, the hypothesis of the elasticity being 
equal to one is rejected (F-statistic 13.234, p-value 0.0006). The implied value for 
the discount factor is close to 0.975. The elasticity turns out to be close to 1.4.
3.4  C red it/G D P
Following the approach by Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001), I also tested the predic­
tion of my model on the credit to GDP ratio. I use data for the period 1960-1995 
for 63 countries4. The dependent variable is Private Credit to GDP (PC), which
4 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo Dem. 
Rep., Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, India, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
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measures claims on the private sector by bank and non-bank financial institution, 
excluding credit to the government and public enterprises. I compute the inflation 
rate from the consumer price index. I take annual averages over the 35 years pe­
riod, in order to focus on the long-run (steady state) relationship of variables. I 
include three main controls: the average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP 
(Growth), the (log of the) average years of schooling in total population (School), 
and the average share of government expenditure on GDP (GovExp)5. These are 
meant to control for alternative factors that may affect inflation and lending ac­
tivities. Higher growth may imply lower inflation and a more rapidly developing 
financial system. More developed countries have more developed financial systems. 
Also the government may combine inflation with restrictions on the financial sector 
to fund expenditures.
The regression shows a (statistically and economically) significant negative co­
efficient for Inflation thus supporting the conclusion that inflation has a negative 
impact on credit. The adjusted R2 is 0.404. White heteroskedasticity consistent 
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
PC =  2.325 — 0.608Inflation + 2.337Growth +  26.594School +  0.189GovExp 
(0.211) (—2.911)** (1.154) (4.058)** (0.384)
3.5 C onclusion
The model presented in chapter 2 is able to generate different behaviors for the 
interest rate. The nominal interest rate might be more or less than unit elastic
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Nepal, New Zeland, 
Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Syria, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, United Kingdom, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
5Here are the sources for the variables: Private Credit, International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
lines 22D and 42D. GDP, IFS, line 99B. CPI, IFS, line 64. Government, Share of government 
expenditures in GDP, World Development Indicators (WDI). School, WDI, Per capita GDP, WDI.
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depending on whether the creditor or the debtor axe holding money for one period. 
In order to distinguish between the two cases I estimated the elasticity of the nominal 
interest rate with respect to inflation with data for 59 countries over the years 1993- 
2003 and found that the nominal interest rate is more than unit elastic with respect 
to the inflation rate.
Chapter 4
Money and Credit: Related  
Issues
4.1 Introduction
The model developed in the previous chapters can be used to explore a number of 
further questions relating to the interaction of money and credit. In this chapter I 
investigate three such issues. First, I analyze in more details the decision to become 
a creditor or a debtor. Second, I consider the question of seigniorage assuming that 
the government buys goods on the money market printing new money. Third, I 
speculate on the possibility of having circulating private credit in the model. To 
address the first issue I assume agents cannot visit both the money market and the 
credit market. The two markets are separated -suppose they are at two extreme 
ends of the island and it takes too long to travel from one side to the other- and 
agents have to decide whether they will visit one or the other. The remaining part 
of the model is unchanged.
In equilibrium agents endogenously partition between debtors and creditors. 
Debtors will travel to their consumption island. They will visit the credit mar­
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ket and issue promises. Then they will travel back to their own island together with 
their creditors. They will produce for money and repay their debt. The following 
day they will rest. A creditor produces for a promise, then follows his debtor and 
waits for repayment with money. The following day he consumes using money. Both 
credit and money are used in exchange although not simultaneously by the same 
agent. Money serves as the means of payment. Credit bears interest.
It is interesting to compare my model with a model of private debt developed by 
Townsend (1980). It is a version of the turnpike model I described in chapter 1. The 
economy is populated by a countably infinite number of agents, each living forever. 
Imagine now an infinite turnpike with two lanes running in opposite direction: east 
and west. Agents axe split between those living on one side of the turnpike and those 
living on the other traveling eastward and westward respectively. Each period they 
travel exactly one mile , they stop, trade with the agent traveling on the opposite 
lane and then resume their itinerary. It is a pure exchange economy and endowments 
are distributed in such a way that each agent is alternatively endowed with one unit 
or zero units of the only good in the economy. When two agents meet one and only 
one has an endowment of the good. Two agents never meet twice in their lifetime. 
This prevents credit to arise, since a promise cannot be repaid. Convert now the 
turnpike into a circle. This opens the possibility for agents to exchange promises, 
since they will now meet for sure in the future and they will thus be able to repay 
their promises. In the model some exogenous bound on the amount of promises to 
be issued has to be imposed in order to obtain a non trivial equilibrium with credit. 
The model moreover left open the question of the coexistence of money and credit.
In my setting the itineraries of agents and their very identity as debtors or 
creditors are not fixed in advance: in equilibrium the population endogenously splits 
in two, debtors and creditors. The issue of the bound on the amount of promises 
is resolved using collateral and the fact that money is used to repay promises. By
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providing an answer to the coexistence of money and credit I obtain an endogenous 
bound on the amount of promises which insures the existence of equilibrium. I 
then discuss seigniorage when the government uses revenue to buy goods on the 
market instead of making transfers to agents. The last part of the chapter deals 
with circulating promises.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 I present the model and I solve 
for the equilibrium. Section 3 compares welfare and output in the economy with 
credit and in the one without. Section 4 analyzes circulating promises. Section 5 
concludes.
4.2 T he M odel
Consider the same structure as before, except that the money market and the credit 
market are now separate and agents can visit only one of them each period. In­
dividuals are characterized by a utility function which I assume to be linear in 
consumption
u(xtj )  =  x tj
where Xtj is the quantity bought at time t on island j  and by a quadratic cost 
function
= 2 (Vt,j)
where ytj  is the quantity produced by producer j .  The objective of an individual of 
type j  will be to maximize
y y  x t,j - ^ 2  (yt+i,j+i)2
teT *-
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where T  = {1,4,7,...} in order to take into account the period in which he is going 
to rest and 0 < j3 < 1 is the rate at which he discounts the future1.
In what follows, I will analyse two arrangements. In the first one, agents visit 
only the money market and don’t issue promises. A purely monetary economy will 
arise, in which agents will use fiat money to exchange in order to overcome the 
absence of double coincidence of wants. I will then move to an economy in which 
agents visit only the credit market and issue their own promises. In this equilibrium 
money acts as a means of final payment for credit, but not as a medium of exchange. 
The only media of exchange are promises.
Let me summarise here what the typical life of an individual in this economy 
will be in each case. In the pure money equilibrium, in the morning an agent j  will 
be on his island ready to trade with agents j  — 1. In the afternoon he will travel to 
island j  -f 1 , in order to be able to produce good j  + 1 and sell his production for 
money. In the evening he will rest. In the equilibrium with promises, agents have to 
decide whether to become debtors or creditors. A debtor j  issues promises secured 
by the collateral in the morning. In the afternoon he produces for money. He repays 
his own promises in the afternoon, by handing fiat money to his creditors (agents 
j  — 1) who have travelled with him and are waiting on island j  +  1. The collateral 
is returned and promises destroyed. In the evening he rests. A creditor j  produces 
for promises and leaves to island j  — 1 where the next period he waits for repayment 
with money to take place. In the evening he travels to island j  in order to consume 
using money.
Assuming those specific functional forms for the utility and the cost function allows me to 
simplify the algebra. Similar results can be obtained by putting the curvature on the utility function 
(e.g. logarithmic utility and linear cost would equally do).
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4.2.1 M oney Holders
I will first consider the case in which all agents visit only the money market. In this 
case, individual j  at time t will use the amount of money accumulated in the past 
(m l-1) to buy goods on the money market, < m^_1, where he will consume.
He will then go on to produce for money in order to carry it into the future, after 
resting for one period: P t+ ij+ iV t+ ij+ i = m 3t+ v  Then he will rest for one period. I 
will use to indicate the quantity bought at time t of good j  with money, Vtj+i 
the quantity sold at time t of good j  + 1 for money and Pt,j+1 the (walrasian) price 
at time t of good j  + 1. The sequence of exchanges gives rise to the following budget 
constraint
m t+2 = Pt+ij+iVt+ij+i + - P t jX t j  
and the cash-in-advance constraint
P tjx f j  < m t-1
Subject to the previous constraints he will maximize
teT L J
where T  = {1,4,7,...} in order to take into account the period in which he is going 
to rest and 0 < ft < 1 is the rate at which he discounts the future. In recursive form 
the problem becomes2
V(m) = max x M -  (yM)2 +  P*V{m!)£
s.t. pxM < m
Since I will compute a symmetric equilibrium I omit indices referring to individuals.
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m! — p'yM +  m  — pxM
where the term V(m!) appears discounted by f33 to take into account the resting 
period.
The equilibrium condition on the goods market will simply be x M = yM , on the 
money market m  = M  and I will require that consumers, producers and individuals 
currently resting in equilibrium want to participate in the exchange process.
The first order conditions for the problem are
1 ~ (6  + 8)p = 0
- 0 y M + 0p' = 0  
0 3V'(m') = 0
where 5 is the multiplier of the cash in advance constraint and 8 of the budget 
constraint. The envelope condition is
V'(m) = (6 + 8)
observe that 6 > 0 when (3 < 1 . Stationarity requires p = p' and m  = m! . Using 
the first order conditions and the envelope condition I can solve for the quantity 
consumed and produced:
X M  =  y M  =  P 2
the price level can be computed from the binding cash in advance constraint
P = J 2 M»
and the participation constraints for consumers, producers and individuals currently 
resting are all satisfied.
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4.2 .2  D e b to rs
Now I will turn to the economy where agents exchange promises, secured by the 
collateral. Agents will issue promises secured by the collateral and they will repay 
their promises with money. The objective of a debtor of type j  will be to maximize
E f t 1 x t j - 0 k ( y t + u + i ) '
teT
where T  = {1,4,7,...} in order to take into account the period in which he is going 
to rest and travel to the island for repayment and 0  < /? < 1 is the rate at which he 
discounts the future, xfy  is the quantity of good j  bought at time t by individual j  
on the credit market, while -+1 the quantity sold for money. Let me define the 
price on the money market for good j  +  1 at time t as pt,j+i and the price on the 
credit market as qtj. Individual j  at time t will visit to the credit market where he 
will sell a promise d\ that will need to be repaid in the future:
% jx?j =  dt
In the following period he will then produce for money in order to pay off his debt:
P t+ ij+ m + ij+ i =  m3t+1 > d\
He will then rest for one period.
The previous sequence of exchanges gives rise to the following budget constraint
m t+ 2 =  Pt+ij+iVt+ij+i +  qt+u+iVt+ij+i +  m t- 1  -  -  QtjXtj
and the repayment constraint
P t+ ij+ iy t+ ij+ i >
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In recursive form the problem becomes
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V(m) =  max x D — (yD)2 +  p 3V(m!)
s.t.p'yD > qxD
m! =  p'yD +  m  — qxc
where V{m!) is discounted by (33 to take into account the resting period.
The first order conditions for xD,yD are respectively
1 -  (A +  j)q  =  0
- P  (yD) +  (A +  7 )p' =  0 
p zV'{rri) = 7
where A is the multiplier associated to the repayment constraint and 7  to the 
budget constraint. The envelope condition is
V'{m) =  7
Notice that necessarily A > 0 when @ < 1. Stationarity requires p =  p1, q = q' 
and m  =  m!. Define 1 +  i =  The system of equations given by the first order 
conditions and the envelope condition can be simplified to give
y D =  — -—  y (1 + 00
x D =  - Y —  = 1
(1  +  0  (1  + i)2 0
The participation constraints for the individuals currently consuming, producing
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and resting are respectively
Vc 2 (1 +  i f  /3 ( l  — /33) >  °
Vv = -------- 2-  —~ 1--------- (4 1 )
P 2 (1  +  i)2 P2 ( l — P3)
Vr ~  2 (1 + i)2/3 (l — f}3) > °
(1) is the only condition that is not automatically verified. To make sure that 
producers want indeed to participate the following condition is therefore needed:
*>({)*
4 .2 .3  C red itors
The objective of a creditor of type j  will be to maximize
jy- -\  (vt+ij+i)2+ pxtj 
ter  L
where T  = {1,4,7,...} in order to take into account the period in which he is going 
to rest and travel to the island for repayment and 0  < ft < 1 is the rate at which he 
discounts the future, is the quantity of good j  bought at time t by individual 
j  on the money market, while y^+1j +i the quantity sold for credit. A creditor will 
first produce for a promise that will be repaid the next day when he will follow his 
debtor on island j  +  1 in order to get his money back:
Qtj+iVtj+i = d 3t = m 3t+1
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then proceed to the money market where he will use the money just acquired to 
purchase commodities:
Pt+2,jx?+2,j < ™i+i
The previous sequence of exchanges gives rise to the following budget constraint
m t+ 2 =  QtJ+lVtJ+1 +  m t+ 1 -  Pt+2,jX?+2,j 
and the cash in advance constraint
Qt,j+iy?,j+i ^  Pt+2,jx t+2,j 
In recursive form the problem is
V(m) — max — i  (yc )2 4- /32x c  +  P3V(m!)
s.t.qyc  > p'xc
m! =  qyc  P m  — p'xc
where V{m!) is discounted by /33 to take into account the resting period.
The first order conditions for xc , yc  are respectively
P2 -  (A +  7 )p' =  0
-  (yC) +  (A +  l)q  = 0 
fV '{ m ! )  = 7
where A is the multiplier associated to the repayment constraint and 7  to the
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budget constraint. The envelope condition is
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V'(m) = 7
Notice that necessarily A > 0 and p > 0 when ft < 1 . Stationarity requires p = p' , 
q =  q' and m  = m!. The system of equations given by the first order conditions and 
the envelope conditions can be simplified to give
yc  = f ( l  + i)
x °  =  (1  +  i ) yc  =  0 2 (1  +  i)2
The participation constraints for the individuals currently consuming, producing 
and resting axe respectively
-  { T f - p V L  + i ?
2 ( l  — P  )
y - /^4 (! +  < ) % „
” 2 ( l  — j03)
fr (2^3 - /3 6) ( l  +  i ) 2 
2 ( l - / 3 3)
4 .2 .4  Indifference and in cen tive  con d ition s
Each agent can choose whether he wants to become a debtor or a creditor. The 
choice involves the decision to be a consumer or a producer in the first period. 
In order to have both debtors and creditors -i.e. for exchange with credit to be 
possible- a new debtor and a new creditor must be indifferent. This is captured by 
the following indifference condition
1 0(1 + i f
2 (1 +  i) 0  ( l — /33) 2 ( l - / ? 3)
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which can be solved to give the interest rate
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( l  +  i) =  i T *  > 1
I also need to check that a new creditor doesn’t have the incentive to become a 
money holder. This is verified since
/34 (1 +  i f  > 0 4
2 ( 1 -  p 3) 2 (1 -  P3)
4 .2 .5  E quilibrium
In equilibrium the population living on each island partitions between debtors and 
creditors. Let fiD be the proportion of debtors and fic  the proportions of creditors. 
Market clearing requires
Moreover
and
(1 + i )  =  p  4
I can solve the system to obtain the exact proportions of debtors and creditors
1 + 0 "  
c  1
f1  ~  31 + / T *
Let me briefly summarise and comment on the main features of the equilibrium 
with credit. In equilibrium agents of every type partition between debtors and
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creditors. A Debtor visits the credit market and issues promises. Then he travels 
together with his creditor. He produces for money and repays his debt. The following 
period he rests. A creditor produces for a promise, then follows his debtor and waits 
for repayment with money. The following period he consumes using money. Both 
credit and money are used in exchange although not simultaneously by the same 
agent. Money serves as the means of payment. Credit bears a higher rate of return.
4.3 W elfare
I compare welfare in the economy with only money and the economy with credit. 
My welfare measure is given by the sum of the value functions of each group of 
agents in the two equilibria, with credit and with money:
^ = 3
/ H ( 2 / 3 - l )  +  / H  (2 — 0 2) 
2 ( l - / 3 ) ( l  +  / H )
fp l /?2 (2 —/?2)
3 2(1 — 0)
Taking the difference between the two, I obtain
^ 5 /  ~  9 9 13 _  _ 13 _ 15 23 \
  i/?  2 ( 2  -  j32 — 2f3i -  (3* + (3 * +2(3 * — 2(3 4 + /? 4 )
W - W  =  ------ -^--------------------------7--------- -r---------------------
3  2 ( i - / 9 ) ( i + r ‘ )
which is positive for any ft < 1.
This confirms that the use of credit improves welfare compared to an economy 
with only money.
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4.4 Seigniorage
Suppose that the government, instead of giving lump-sum transfers to agents, inter­
venes issuing money every period and buying goods on the money market on each 
island. I will label Gt,j the quantity bought by the government on island j  at time 
t. This modifies the equilibrium condition on the money market to:
x tfj + GtJ = Vtj
The remaining structure and notation is left unchanged. The government budget 
constraint equates the increase in the money supply on each island to the value of 
the commodities bought on the money market:
Mt -  Mt- i  = ptG
which can be rewritten as
Mt M t-1 p t-i + G
P t  P t - i  P t
In a stationary equilibrium the real quantity of money is constant from period 
to period
Mt _  Mt~ i _
P t  P t - 1  ^
Therefore the government budget constraint becomes
^ i h ] = G
The problem in recursive form for the equilibrium with money and credit will be
V{m) =  max xM + xc  -  (yM +  yc f  +  f iV(m!)
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s.t. pxM < m  
p'yM > qxC 
m! =  p'yM -|- q'yc  +  m  — pxM — qxc
The equilibrium conditions axe
x m  + G = yM
x c  = yc
m = M
The solution of the problem gives 
total output is
yM +  y C = _ J ] _
( 1  +  7r)2
The real demand for money
a
which gives, using the government budget constraint, the government expenditures
/3  2 7T
G =
+  ( 1  + 7 f ) 2 ^  ( 1  - f  7 r )
and using the equilibrium condition on the money market
0
+  ( l + 7 r ) 2 ^  ( 1  +  7r)
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Total consumption will then be
M  , P 2 + ^ 2 (1 +  7r)2x +  x =
2 +  ( 1  +  tt) 2 ^  ( 1  + 7 r )
The interesting aspect to notice is that the revenue collected by the government 
in the form of seigniorage
i
7r  p  2 7T
A4'
1 +  7r 4 - ( l  +  7r)3) (1 +  tt)
is an inverted U shape function of the inflation rate, similar to a Laffer curve.
4.5 On th e  C irculation o f Prom ises
An interesting question to address in the framework presented so far is whether 
credit can circulate in the economy, in the sense that the same promise is held 
successively by two different agents and then redeemed by the original issuer from 
a third party. Credit becomes inside money. "Inside money can be defined very 
broadly as any privately-issued long-term paper that is held by a number of agents in 
succession. Whenever paper circulates as a means of short-term savings (liquidity), 
it can properly be considered as money, or a medium of exchange, because agents 
hold it not for its maturity value but for its exchange value." Kiyotaki and Moore 
(2000).
The model features absence of double coincidence of wants, spatial separation 
and competitive markets. Agents move to different islands to consume and produce. 
Moreover they can issue promises secured by collateral and repaid with money. 
Money and credit coexist thanks to a friction in the exchange technology that pre­
vents agents from spending money immediately -the resting period-. In the equi­
librium with money and circulating promises, a typical agent j  in the morning
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exchanges money, old promises and newly issued promises to purchase and consume 
good j.  In the afternoon he meets agents j  +  1 and produces for money, second 
hand promises and newly issued promises. Agent j  embarks on the ship leaving to 
island j  — 1, where he arrives in the evening. There he meets the holders of his own 
promises. With the money acquired in the previous period on the money market he 
repays the promises thus getting back his collateral. Promises are then destroyed 
and he is ready to travel to island j  +  1 and restart the cycle. Money and credit co­
exist, credit circulates and money serves also to repay credit. There is rate of return 
dominance: the gross return on money is one, the return on second hand promises 
is 1 -M2 =  /3-1 > 1 and the return on newly issued promises is 1 +  i\ = fi~2 > /?-1 . 
Moreover total production is higher than in an economy with only money: f  >
The higher return that producers axe getting induces them to increase their pro­
duction compared to an economy with only money. Finally, welfare in the economy 
with circulating credit is higher than in the economy with only money. With steady 
inflation, the nominal interest rate increases making costly to hold money. Agents 
holding a second hand promise will have to hold money overnight before repaying 
their promises: they will reduce their holdings of second hand promises more than 
their holdings of newly issued promises. The ratio of second hand promises to newly 
issued promises in real terms decreases with inflation. Also the ratio of newly issued 
promises to money decreases with inflation. Since less transactions are performed 
also output, consumption and welfare axe lower. Concerning the question of the 
circulation of credit there are few contributions in the literature. The paper by 
Townsend and Wallace (1982) features spatial sepaxation and circulating debt. The 
focus in that paper is however on the coordination problems arising in a decentralised 
economy where agents use privately issued means of exchange rather than the issue 
of the coexistence with fiat money. Kiyotaki and Moore (2000) construct a model of 
inside money ”to ask: when and why is the circulation of inside money essential to
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the smooth running of the economy?” . The model -which addresses also a number 
of other issues not directly connected to the present inquiry- is built around an ab­
sence of double coincidence of wants in dated goods rather than in physical goods. 
Markets are competitive but there is no walrasian auctioneer. Agents can issue their 
own promises by mortgaging only a fraction of the output they are going to pro­
duce in the future. They find parameter values such that promises are essential and 
circulate.
Freeman (1996) has a paper where purchases are made with debt, debt is settled 
with a final payment of fiat money and there is a market for resale of debt. The 
model itself is however quite different, being cast in an overlapping generation struc­
ture to which he added spatial separation. Moreover in Freeman (1996) the clearing 
system is centralized: agents need to move to a central island to clear debts, while 
in my paper the repayment process is completely decentralised. A related paper 
in the OLG tradition is Azariadis, Bullard and Smith (2001). In their framework, 
the question of the coexistence of the two instruments can be meaningfully posed 
and some answers are provided about the social benefits of a mixed system. Their 
environment features heterogeneous agents, spatial separation and limited communi­
cation. Borrowers and lenders can meet only once during their three period lifetime. 
In such a setting private liabilities can be issued by borrowers to lenders who in turn 
use them to exchange with trading partners that will meet the original issuers and 
will thus be able to present the liabilities for redemption. These liabilities there­
fore circulate in the economy and constitute indeed a form of inside money. In an 
economy without outside money they find indeterminacy of equilibrium and high 
volatility of consumption and interest rates. In an economy with both outside and 
inside money, the equilibrium turns out to be determinate and -strikingly- efficient.
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4.6 Conclusion
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In this Chapter, I derived an equilibrium in which money and credit coexist, credit 
has a higher rate of return and improves welfare. Agents decide whether they want to 
become creditors or debtors and partition accordingly in equilibrium. Some agents 
-debtors- will buy on credit and sell on money (and use money to repay their debt), 
some others -creditors- will sell for credit and buy with money. This arrangement 
dominates the one in which only money is used. I then moved on to derive the 
seigniorage revenue of a government which is buying goods instead of making trans­
fers. I also discussed the interesting possibility of having promises circulate in the 
economy. Promises can be issued to purchase commodities and then used by the 
creditor to purchase commodities from a third party and then redeemed with money 
by the issuer from the third party. Privately issued promises would thus constitute 
a form of inside money in the model. Further interesting questions to be addressed 
in this framework include studying the interaction of cooperating and competing 
media of exchange and understanding the redistributive effects of monetary policy. 
These are left for future research.
Chapter 5
Illiquid Bonds and Promises
5.1 Introduction
According to Hicks -in his famous ”Suggestion for simplifying the theory of money”- 
the main challenge of monetary theory is to explain the coexistence of money and 
interest bearing assets. Why do people hold simultaneously assets having different 
rates of return? Kocherlakota (2003) gives a clever explanation of why nominal 
risk-free bonds yielding a positive rate of return may coexist with money -the zero 
rate of return asset- and be essential in monetary economies. The intuition is as 
follows. Money has an essential role in performing intratemporal exchanges being 
the medium of exchange. Agents have different intertemporal marginal rates of 
substitution: half of the agents experience a liquidity shock. This creates a need for 
further intertemporal trades of money that are accomplished using nominal risk-free 
bonds with a positive rate of return. A liquid bond -i.e. a bond that is portable 
and can be exchanged for goods- wouldn’t serve the purpose since it would have the 
same rate of return as money. An illiquid bond -i.e. a bond that is non-portable and 
cannot be exchanged for commodities- commands a positive rate of return and is 
essential in insuring against liquidity shocks. Agents with urgent need of liquidity,
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sell their bonds for money to agents with less need for immediate liquidity. An 
example of an illiquid bond is a registered US Treasury bond.
In this paper, I argue that illiquidity alone may not be enough to guarantee 
that bonds are essential. If agents cannot be prevented from using a commitment 
technology allowing them to issue promises secured by bonds, bonds themselves 
cannot be used to insure against liquidity shocks, since their rate of return is driven 
to zero. Consider the following scenario. Agents, instead of trading bonds for 
money on the asset market, have the option to store them in a vault and issue 
promises backed by them, using the key of the vault as a guarantee. Agents not 
experiencing the liquidity shock are willing to issue promises. This drives down 
the rate of return on bonds to zero. For low values of the liquidity shock, agents 
experiencing it are better off and promises improve welfare. For higher values of the 
liquidity shock however agents experiencing the shock are worse off and welfare is 
lower with promises. In this case legal restrictions on the intermediation of bonds 
would improve welfare. In the 19th century in the US banks used to be able to issue 
private money fully backed by bonds. One way to interpret the present result is to 
argue that such an activity was often welfare reducing. Section 2 presents the result. 
Section 3 concludes.
5.2 T he M odel
Time is discrete and continues for ever. There are three islands. Island 3 is inhabited 
by a unit measure of households, where each household has two members, a consumer 
and a producer. There are two types of perishable goods and two types of households: 
households of type 1 consume good 1 and produce good 2, while households of type 
2 consume good 2 and produce good 1. A type i = 1,2 household seeks to maximize
oo
9j log (c0) -  2/0 +  P  (log M  “  yt)
t=l
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where c* is consumption of good i, yt  is production of good i +  1 and Oj £ { 0 h , 0 l },  
with 6 l  = 1 and Oh  >  1 >  ft. 6j  is a shock to preferences, capturing the liquidity 
shock and is privately observed. The shock hits half of the agents in period zero 
only.
At the beginning of each period all households axe on island 3. Good 1 can be 
produced on island 2 and good 2 on island 1 only. Then, producers of good 1 move to 
island 2 and producers of good 2 move to island 1. Consumers of good 1 visit island 1 
and consumers of good 2 visit island 2. Exchange takes place in competitive markets. 
There is no record keeping technology and enforcement is limited. There axe also 
two durable and divisible objects: money and nominal bonds. A nominal bond lasts 
only one period, it is withdrawn and exchanged for money by the government in 
period one. On island 3 in period zero there is a competitive asset market on which 
households can exchange money and bonds. Agents axe endowed with an amount 
M  of money and an amount B  of bonds and they txade them at a pxice q in texms 
of money. The relative price of goods in terms of money is p. Households choose 
(ct,yt,M t, M q, B o) > 0 to maximize utility subject to the constraint on trade in the 
asset market in period zero Mq +  qBo < M  + qB, where Bo is the amount of bonds 
agents buy; the cash-in-advance constraint in period zero p q Co <  M q, the budget 
constraint in period one M i =  Mq — poco +  poyo +  Bq\ from period one on, the 
economy is purely monetary and the constraints are the cash-in-advance and budget 
constraint ptCt <  Mt and Mt+i < Mt — ptCt +  PtVt respectively. Finally, there is a 
capacity constraint on the amount agents can produce 0 < yt < 1. An Equilibrium 
for the economy with money and bonds is a sequence of consumption, production, 
money holdings, bond holdings and prices such that at all times (ct,yt, Mt, Mq, Bo) 
maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, the cash-in-advance constraint 
and the constraint on the exchange of money and bonds; (pt,q ) clear the goods 
market and the asset market. Surprisingly the solution in Kocherlakota (2003)
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doesn’t account for the participation constraints of agents. In an economy without 
enforcement agents should be willing to participate at every stage including the asset 
market stage. In this economy, agents have always the option to secure c =  1 for 
themselves by not trading on the asset market. Once the participation constraints 
are taken into account, the following is an equilibrium for sufficiently high ft and 9. 
The price in period zero is po =  M  and from period one onwards is pt =  M  +  B. 
The price on the bonds market is q = M+0B+2B • Production is always at capacity: 
yt = 1. Consumption for agents with a high shock is higher in period zero than in 
period one: c q ( H )  =  — , co(L) =  ■ Consumption for agents with a low
shock is lower in period zero than in period one: c\(H) =  ci(L) =
Consumption thereafter is c* =  1 for all agents. Agents with a high shock sell all 
their bonds in period zero Bo (H) = 0 and agents with a low shock buy all bonds 
B q (L) =  2 B. In equilibrium agents experiencing a high liquidity shock (H ) sell their 
bonds to agents with a low (L) shock for money -at a relative price less than one-. 
Agents with a more urgent need to consume can increase their purchases of goods. 
The following period the L agents receive their payoff from matured bonds and 
consume more than H  agents. From then on the economy reverts to the stationary 
equilibrium without bonds. Illiquid bonds insure agents against preference shocks. 
All agents are better off and illiquid bonds are essential. When (3 and 9 are lower, 
agents choose Bo (H) = Bo (L) = B, i.e. they don’t trade on the asset market, and 
consume co(j) =  1 for all j.
Assume on island 3 vaults are available. The key of the vault can be taken away 
only if bonds axe stored in the vault. Vaults are secure against theft. Bonds and 
keys cannot be counterfeited. Bond holders can now use bonds to issue their own 
promises. Before moving to the next island to trade, they can store the bond in a 
vault and take the key with them. When they arrive on their consumption island 
they can issue a promise, giving the key to the producer as a guarantee. The vault
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is a safe keeping technology and the key a commitment technology. The holder of 
the key has the right to go to island 3 and take the bond from the vault. Agents 
cannot commit not to use the vault. Historically, banks used to provide safe keeping 
and issue private money backed by bonds.
The equilibrium with money and promises backed by bonds has pt = M  + B, 
q — 1 and ct = yt = 1 at all times. In particular <7 — 1 by no arbitrage. Suppose 
agents with a low shock get the same utility in the two equilibria:
l0g +  ^ l0g(  M +  fl*)  = lo&1 + &lo&1 =  0 t5-1)
which requires agents to be impatient enough:
log
Agents with a high shock are better off in the equilibrium with promises if the 
liquidity shock is not too high:
eH log ( Mm9B) + P log ( j j ^ B  )  <  log 1 +  0  log 1 =  0 (5.2)
and substituting j3 in (2):
" “ l o g ^ l o g ^ )
Since M±B > Ifgf m d J L g  >  e > ! .
Therefore, there exist a 6 > 1, such that for 1 < Oh  < Q, low shock agents are 
indifferent and high shock agents are better off with promises. Not surprisingly, 
this happens exactly in the parameters region where illiquid bonds were not traded. 
When Oh  > 0 high shock agents are worse off. For higher values of the liquidity
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shock, legal restrictions on the intermediation of bonds can be advocated.
5.3 C onclusion
The point is reminiscent of the literature on legal restrictions. ” There are no natural 
barriers that limit substitution between privately issued inside money on the one 
hand and outside or government-issued money on the other hand” (Wallace (1983)). 
In an economy with money and nominal risk-free interest bearing securities some 
barrier has to be present to explain the difference in the rate of return. It could 
be that securities come in large denominations. Indivisibility was the subject of 
Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996). It could also be that bonds are registered, not 
bearer assets. Illiquidity is the subject of Kocherlakota (2003). Both reasons are 
however not enough to explain the difference in the rate of returns, since -as pointed 
out by Wallace (1983)- some agents could create promises fully backed by bonds 
and drive the rate of return to zero. Historically the best example is the National 
Banking System in place in the US between 1865 and 1913, where each bank could 
issue its own banknotes secured by government bonds. At the time, nominal interest 
rates were exceptionally low. Legal restrictions is the subject of the present paper. 
When some agents have a very urgent need of liquidity, legal restrictions against 
intermediation can be advocated to improve welfare. A way to interpret the result 
is to argue that in 1913 banks were prevented to issue private money backed by 
bonds since the activity was welfare decreasing.
Chapter 6
Entry of Lenders and Liquidity 
of Assets
In1 the last two decades several financially liberalized countries, such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries, the East Asian countries, have ex­
perienced an aggressive entry of new lenders into their credit markets. Cross-border 
lending has played an important role in this process. Japanese banks increased their 
presence in the United States during the 1980’s and in East Asia during the 1990’s 
(Peek and Rosengren (2000a)).2 Within the United States, after the abolition of 
interstate branching restrictions by the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act, banks have expanded 
their business beyond state borders. The impact of financial liberalization has had 
a functional dimension besides a geographic one, with lenders spreading their loan 
portfolios beyond their traditional area of activity.3
The mechanisms through which new (foreign) lenders interact with incumbent 
economic actors are non-obvious. The entry of lenders into liberalized economies
lrThis chapter is coauthored with Raoul Minetti.
2 Peek and Rosengren (2000a) report that in the late 1980’s Japanese banks accounted for up to 
18% of Consumer and Investment loans in the United States.
3For example, in the 1980’s, Nordic and UK banks increased their involvement in the real estate 
sector, funding speculative builders.
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and sectors has allegedly had dramatic effects on firms’ behavior and the nature of 
their projects. According to The Economist (1999), the effect of entry has been to 
“increase the riskiness of traditional behavior or introduce new and inexperienced 
players” .4 Is this view justified? Do changes in project riskiness have a feedback 
effect on the entry of lenders? What is the impact on economic stability? Recent 
research on financial crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)) has identified a pat­
tern: crises tend to be preceded by episodes of financial liberalization. Concerns 
have mounted on the possible destabilizing behavior of foreign financial institutions 
(Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000)). “Arguments against allowing the entry of 
foreign banks into domestic markets usually include concerns (...) that foreign banks 
will not serve as a stabilizing influence by providing additional credit during a crisis 
in the host country” (Peek and Rosengren (2000b, p. 147)). Yet, the few existing 
empirical studies reveal that lending by foreign banks exhibits a less procyclical pat­
tern than that of domestic ones and that a stronger presence of foreign banks is 
associated with greater output stability.
In this chapter, we address these issues. We put forward a theory of the interac­
tion between the entry of lenders into a market and the nature of projects based on 
firms’ liquidation values. We then analyze the implications that this interaction has 
for output stability. We call “incumbents” (respectively “newcomers”) lenders with 
a consolidated (lack of) experience of the market. The crucial feature of our econ­
omy is that newcomers have lower ability than incumbents to extract value from the 
assets of borrowers. The disadvantage of newcomers could materialize at the bank­
ruptcy stage because newcomers could be less aware of local insolvency practices. 
Hermalin and Rose (1999, p. 373), argue that “an alien legal system means that 
a foreign lender’s domestic expertise on enforcement is of lower value; the foreign 
lender may, therefore, need to make expensive investments in acquiring the neces­
4The Economist. “Finance on the loose.” May 15th 1999.
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sary expertise or become reliant on expensive local expertise” . The disadvantage 
of newcomers could also materialize at the redeployment stage. When second-hand 
users feature heterogeneous efficiency in employing assets, the disadvantage of new­
comers in liquidating assets could be their lower ability to identify the most efficient 
users in the secondary market. As this ability is at least partly a by-product of the 
information gathered by a lender in her credit relationships, a newcomer with no 
history of lending to local firms will be likely to lack this ability (see section 6.1.5 
for an example along these lines).
We show that the entry of newcomers and the riskiness of projects can reinforce 
each other through firms’ liquidation values. The intuition is as follows. In our econ­
omy, entrepreneurs can choose between safe projects and risky projects that offer 
higher returns.5 With some probability, both types of projects need to be refinanced 
at an intermediate stage. Because of their high liquidation skills, incumbents have 
strong incentives to terminate projects with high probability of failure and liqui­
date their assets rather than refinancing. Because of their lower ability to liquidate, 
instead, newcomers are reluctant to liquidate a project prematurely and always refi­
nance, even if it becomes clear that the project has high probability of failure. Their 
softer budget constraint in refinancing high-risk/return projects renders newcomers 
more appealing lenders than incumbents. However, the lower liquidation skills of 
newcomers make their funding more costly because newcomers expect a lower return 
from asset liquidation if a project fails. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs who derive 
high returns from risky projects borrow from newcomers, sustaining the associated 
extra cost of funding, and choose high-risk/return projects; entrepreneurs who derive 
low returns from risky projects borrow from incumbents and choose safe projects, 
saving on funding costs.
Now, consider an exogenous shock to asset liquidity that affects liquidation val-
5The assumption that on average risky projects are more productive than safe projects is common 
in the literature. New riskier technologies can be more productive.
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ues. Suppose a negative shock is realized depressing liquidation values. The fall in 
the liquidation price of assets erodes the cost advantage of incumbents that stems 
from their higher liquidation skills. By eroding the cost advantage of incumbents, the 
price fall pushes some entrepreneurs to switch to newcomers and choose risky projects, 
spurring the expected default rate and supply of liquidated assets. In turn, this in­
duces a further fall of the liquidation price of assets. In fact, as the number of 
liquidated assets increases, lenders have to sell assets to less productive second-hand 
users who are willing to pay a lower price. This induces further entrepreneurs to 
switch to newcomers and high-risk/return projects and so forth.
The mutually reinforcing interaction between the entry of newcomers and the 
share of high-risk/return projects stabilizes output following liquidity shocks, such 
as those occurring in booms and recessions. In our economy, the share of high- 
risk/return projects is suboptimally low. The high liquidation skills of incumbents, 
coupled with contractual incompleteness, render incumbents too conservative to­
wards high-risk/return projects. Entrepreneurs can escape incumbents’ too hard 
budget constraint by borrowing from newcomers who, however, axe only an imper­
fect substitute for incumbents. In fact, newcomers impose on entrepreneurs the cost 
of their low liquidation skills, discouraging some entrepreneurs from borrowing from 
them and implementing risky projects. Following, for example, a negative shock to 
asset liquidity, the cost of the low liquidation skills of newcomers declines and more 
entrepreneurs choose newcomers and risky projects, approaching the optimal share 
of high-risk/return projects. This dampens the negative impact on output of the 
decline in asset liquidity. The model can therefore rationalize the empirical findings 
on the stabilizing role of foreign financial institutions (see section 6.2.4).
The closest papers in the literature are Diamond and Rajan (2001a, b), Dewa- 
tripont and Maskin (1995) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992). In analyzing the rationale 
for the short-term liability structure of banks, Diamond and Rajan (2001a, b) argue
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that banks have better liquidation skills than dispersed investors. Diamond and Ra- 
jan (2001b) also qualitatively discuss applications of their theory. By interpreting 
dispersed investors as foreign investors, they argue that foreign, short-term lending 
intermediated by domestic banks allows domestic banks to commit their superior 
liquidation skills and fund illiquid projects. When we interpret newcomers as foreign 
lenders, there are at least three differences between our analysis and this applica­
tion of their theory. First, we analyze the implications of direct foreign lending, in 
substitution of domestic lending, rather than of foreign lending intermediated by do­
mestic banks. Secondly, we describe a two way interaction between type of projects 
undertaken and direct foreign lending. Diamond and Rajan (2001b) analyze how 
short term debt spurs the number of illiquid projects but do not analyze possible 
feedbacks, even less so through firms’ liquidation values (exogenous in their context). 
Finally, the type of projects that foreign lending allows financing differs: while they 
focus on illiquid projects, we focus on high-risk/return ones. In the analysis (section 
6.2.1), we show that our model can offer an explanation for the evolution of projects 
in East Asia before the 1997-98 crisis different from that of Diamond and Rajan 
(2001b).
In Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), some firms choose between long term, very 
profitable projects and short term profitable ones while other firms choose between 
long term poor projects and short term profitable ones.6 Dewatripont and Maskin 
(1995) show that in a decentralized economy, meant as one in which the ownership 
of capital is diffuse and firms borrow from multiple sources, lenders can have a too 
hard budget constraint towards long term very profitable projects. This leads firms 
to prefer short term projects (short-termism). In their context, lenders have all the 
same skills so that there is no room for analyzing the entry of lenders “foreign” to
6 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) introduce long term very profitable projects in a second stage 
of their analysis. In a first stage, they focus on the choice between short term, profitable projects 
and long term, poor ones.
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the market. Furthermore, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) focus on “investment 
horizons” and project length while we focus on the riskiness of projects and their 
endogenous liquidation values. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) analyze the interaction 
between the debt leverage of firms and liquidation values and the role of the liquidity 
of assets in this interaction. Despite our different focus, we share with them the 
emphasis on endogenous firms’ liquidation values. If one believes that the entry of 
lenders has important effects on firms’ average riskiness and default rate, treating 
liquidation values as endogenous and analyzing their possible feedback on the entry 
of lenders appears to be necessary.
The chapter also relates to the literature on the entry of new lenders into a 
credit market (see, for example, Broecker (1990); Dell’Ariccia, Friedman, and Mar­
quez (1999)). This literature generally analyzes the impact of this entry on the 
efficiency and on the structure of the credit sector. In analyzing the limits to perfect 
competition in the credit market, Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) assume that existing 
lenders have more information than new lenders on the riskiness of borrowers. This 
allows them to fund safe borrowers, leaving potential new lenders exposed to ad­
verse selection and blocking their entry. In their context, risk deters the entry of new 
lenders while in ours the riskiness of projects and the entry of newcomers reinforce 
each other. Furthermore, in their model, as in the other studies in this literature, 
asset liquidity and liquidation values play no role in the entry of new lenders. Fi­
nally, our model departs from this literature in its emphasis on the real sector. In 
particular, the paper analyzes how the interaction between the entry of lenders and 
the nature of projects affects output stability.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 
discusses its applications and limitations. In this section, we also assess the empirical 
predictions of the model, comparing them with the existing evidence. Section 3 
concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
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6.1 The Model
6.1.1 Setup
E nv ironm en t and  Technology The economy lasts for three dates, 0, 1 and 
2. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs of mass 1 and two continua of lenders 
(“incumbents” and “newcomers”) each of mass greater than 1. There is initially 
only the final good, while assets can be produced. All agents are risk neutral and 
consume final good at date 2.
Entrepreneurs have no endowment. At date 0, each entrepreneur can start a 
safe project or a risky one. In both projects at date 0 the entrepreneur can invest 
an amount Iq of final good and at date 1 transform it into A  indivisible, productive 
assets.7 With probability 1 — a  production is “fast” and at date 1 the assets yield 
Y , whether the project is safe or risky. With probability a  production is “slow” 
and at date 1 the entrepreneur must inject an additional amount l \  of final good. 
If the refinancing occurs and the project is safe, at date 2 the assets yield Y /p 3 
with probability ps (0 < Ps < 1) or the project fails, the assets yield 0 and one 
non-depreciated asset can be redeployed outside the firm. If the refinancing occurs 
and the project is risky, at date 2 the assets yield (Y  +  y)/pr with probability 
pr (0 < pr < p3) or the project fails, the assets yield 0 and one non-depreciated 
asset can be redeployed. Finally, if the refinancing does not occur and the assets 
are not used in production, at date 2 the project fails with certainty and the A  
non-depreciated assets can be redeployed. y/pr constitutes the entrepreneur-specific 
return of a risky project, with y uniformly distributed on the support [0,1].
If at date 2 an asset is redeployed, it can be used by other entrepreneurs. For 
simplicity, we assume that each entrepreneur can use zero or one liquidated asset. 
Let a£ G a  [£, 1] (£ > 1 —pr) be the share of entrepreneurs who can use one liquidated
7 The assumption that assets are indivisible simplifies the analysis of their secondary market later
on.
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asset and A the amount of final good that each of them can produce with it, with A 
uniformly distributed on the support [0,£].8
We impose a lower bound on the output of completed projects:
Y  > J0/ ( l  - a )  + h +  A. (6.1)
Assumption (1) guarantees that at date 0 the net expected return from a project 
is strictly positive and that at date 1 the expected return from refinancing a project 
exceeds the return from liquidating its assets.
In Figure 1 we summarize the timing of events.
F inancing  Each lender has at least an amount Io +  I\ of final good at date 0 
that she can store or lend. At date 0 and date 1 lending takes place in one to 
one relationships, i.e. one lender funds one entrepreneur and one entrepreneur is 
funded by one lender only. Therefore, at date 1 the project of an entrepreneur can 
be refinanced only by her date 0 lender.9
We assume that the date 1 refinancing decision of a lender is non-contractible. We 
restrict the date 0 (non-renegotiable) contract between a lender and an entrepreneur 
to a standard debt contract that specifies a loan of Iq at date 0 and a repayment 
R  at date 2. If at date 2 the project fails, the lender can recover proceeds from the 
redeployment of the non-depreciated assets up to the agreed repayment i?.10
The two types of lenders differ only in their ability to recover and/or redeploy 
the assets of their borrower. Possibly because of lack of earlier experience of the 
local insolvency practices or secondary market, each newcomer faces a liquidation
8 The lower bound on I will guarantee that the demand and the supply of assets always cross at 
a price greater than zero.
9We are assuming that at date 1 an entrepreneur cannot use funds saved from the first period. 
For example, we can think that in the first period the entrepreneur cannot rim the project and 
simultaneously store funds in excess of Iq borrowed at date 0.
10We are implicitly assuming that a lender cannot be repaid with the proceeds that her borrower 
can obtain from using a liquidated asset, possibly because these proceeds accrue to the entrepreneur 
too late.
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cost proportional to the value of liquidated assets.11 Let 1 — $ be the fraction of 
liquidated value that is lost by a newcomer with
D a t e  0 D a t e  1 D a t e  2
I n v e s t m e n t  R e f i n a n c i n g  R e d e p l o y m e n t  of  A s s e t s
C o n s u m  pt ion
F a s t  P r o d u c t i o n  
(1*a) ^
Y/ p ,S a f e  P ro j e c t
1 A s s e t
S lo w P r o d u c t i o n  0
Ri sky  P r o j e c t
1 A s s e t
A A s s e t s
R e d e p l o y m e n t
Figure 1: Timing of Events.
We motivate assumption (2) later in the analysis (section 6.1.3). We also assume 
that an entrepreneur faces a liquidation cost higher than that of a newcomer. This 
assumption captures the idea that concentrated lenders, such as banks, develop 
superior skills for reorganizing funded firms and liquidating their assets (Sheard 
(1989); Habib and Johnsen (1999)).12 For the results it does not matter whether the 
liquidation cost is real or a transfer (see also section 6.1.4).
11 In a similar way, Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr (1995) assume that transaction costs exist in 
transacting capital in a secondary capital market and that these costs are proportional to the value 
of traded capital. Liquidation costs in selling assets include commissions, fees or also the time 
required to arrange a sale or purchase of an asset.
12 According to Habib and Johnsen (1999) it is reasonable to assume that the entrepreneur lacks 
the skill even to identify the asset’s next best use or to recognize the occurence of the bad states, 
in which case he risks mantaining it in a suboptimal use.
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Secondary M arket Lenders can sell the assets recovered from borrowers in a spot 
secondary market that opens at date 2. We denote with q > 0 the resale price of an 
asset in the secondary market. Entrepreneurs can finance the purchase of liquidated 
assets borrowing in the credit market. We assume that the mass of lenders is such 
that at date 2 the available funds are more than enough to finance these purchases.
D iscussion of th e  S etup
Our specification of technology and financing is close to that of several studies. We 
now discuss this specification in detail, relating it to the literature.
Technology The timing of production decisions resembles that proposed by 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). In their economy, long term, profitable projects 
and long term poor ones populate entrepreneurs’ opportunity set and both types 
of projects must be refinanced at an intermediate stage. Our specification of the 
technology departs from Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) in two main dimensions: 
the nature of the projects and the endogenous, general equilibrium determination 
of liquidation values. The way we generate a downward sloping demand for liqui­
dated assets, i.e. allowing for heterogeneous ability of second-hand users, is also 
standard. A similar assumption can be found in Gorton and Huang (2004); fur­
thermore, Ramey and Shapiro (2001), Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Habib and 
Johnsen (1999) provide several foundations for this assumption.13 Later in the paper 
(section 6.1.5), we also show that the heterogeneous ability of second-hand users can 
be used to endogenize the different liquidation skills of incumbents and newcomers.
13According to Ramey and Shapiro (2001, p. 961), “Most capital is specialized by industry, 
so that used capital typically has greater value inside than outside the industry. Even within an 
industry, though, capital from one firm may not be a perfect match for another firm”. In Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992), the best alternative users of assets are other entrepreneurs active in the same 
sector.
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F inancing  On the financing side, we have to discuss two interrelated features: 
the control exerted by the lender through the interim refinancing and the incom­
pleteness of contracts. A word of caution is due here. This paper has an aggregate 
focus. Hence, we have chosen a parsimonious specification of these features that 
effectively conveys our message. In what follows, we show that this specification 
can be motivated in different ways and that we could obtain the same results bor­
rowing richer, though more complex, specifications from the literature on financial 
contracts.
The Control of the Lender. Starting by the lender’s control, we borrow from a 
vast literature the idea that firms are frequently locked into their original lenders 
and cannot address new financiers for the refinancing of projects (Rajan (1992)). In 
some papers, this feature is justified with firms’ informational opaqueness. In other 
words, new lenders are unwilling to refinance ongoing projects because, unlike the 
original lenders, they lack information on these projects. We could slightly enrich 
the model and endogenize such a problem of adverse selection. For example, some 
of the slow projects could be “rotten” (in the spirit of Dewatripont and Maskin 
(1995)) and at the refinancing stage only the original lender could be able to discern 
a rotten project from one with a positive net expected return.
It is also important to stress that in our economy the lender’s “refinancing” 
could be replaced by any costly action that the lender must implement to allow 
continuation of the project. Aghion and Bolton (1992) introduce the analogous 
assumption that the lender takes an interim, non-contractible action which is critical 
for the success of the project. This action may consist of voting for the adoption of a 
production plan if the lender has representatives on the board of the firm, providing 
strategic advice to the firm, and so forth. For many types of actions, the original 
lender may be irreplaceable because she has achieved experience and soft knowledge 
which cannot be transferred to a new financier.
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Contractual Incompleteness. It is well known in the literature that the lender’s 
control potentially generates inefficiency if the lender cannot contractually commit 
to the interim action and it is costly or, in the limit infeasible, to provide her 
with pecuniary incentives to take this action (Aghion and Bolton (1992); Rajan 
(1992); Diamond and Rajan (2001a); Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)). In fact, in 
our economy the interim action (refinancing) is non-contractible. Furthermore, the 
use of standard debt contracts prevents from specifying a repayment to the lender 
contingent on the realized output. The use of debt contracts can be motivated by 
assuming, for example, that only an amount Y  of output is verifiable in courts, 
regardless of the state of nature and of the type of project. Alternatively, there are 
several institutional rationales for our focus on debt contracts, which we share with 
a vast literature (e.g. Rajan, (1992)). For example, if we interpret lenders as banks, 
this focus matches the regulatory restrictions that in several countries prevent banks 
from holding equity participations in firms. Furthermore, Tornell and Westermann 
(2003) document firms’ widespread use of standard debt contracts in a large number 
of countries.
Finally, the non-renegotiability of contracts is worth further discussion. In the 
literature, this is often exogenously motivated with the presence of high renegotiation 
costs. Even if we allowed contracts to be perfectly renegotiable at the refinancing 
stage, under the assumption that output is partly non-verifiable, our results would be 
unaltered. Indeed, in a previous version of this paper we allowed for renegotiability 
but we imposed a restriction on the amount of verifiable output Y . Alternatively, 
following Rajan (1992), there is a straightforward, endogenous way to motivate the 
lack of renegotiability in our economy. Since an entrepreneur is locked into her 
original lender at the refinancing stage, a problem of hold-up will arise in the ex­
post renegotiation of the contract. Precisely, the original lender may exploit her 
monopoly and extract surplus beyond what is strictly necessary to compensate her
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for the refinancing of the project. As shown by Rajan (1992), if the lender has 
sufficiently high bargaining power, expecting this rent-extraction, an entrepreneur 
may prefer entering a non-renegotiable contract to prevent the hold-up.14 Clearly, 
an appealing feature of this approach is that it bundles together the lock-in problem 
and the non-renegotiability of contracts.
6.1 .2  E quilibrium
E n trep ren eu rs  First, we characterize the choice of entrepreneurs at date 0. Each 
entrepreneur chooses whether to borrow from an incumbent (henceforth denoted by 
superscript i) or from a newcomer (denoted by n) and whether to implement a safe 
project (henceforth denoted by subscript s) or a risky one (denoted by r). Let R l 
(Rn) stand for the repayment due to an incumbent (a newcomer) at date 2. Let 
also dj (d j) be an indicator variable (0,1) for the date 1 refinancing decision of an 
incumbent (a newcomer) if the slow state is realized and the project is of type j ,  
with j  = s, r  (when dj (dj) = 1 the incumbent (newcomer) refinances). In (3) ((4)), 
we report the expected return of an entrepreneur from choosing a lender of type t
14 Ex-ante the lender may be unable to compensate the entrepreneur for the ex-post rent extrac­
tion. For example, the expected return from the fast state may fall short of the expected rents 
extracted in the slow state. Furthermore, without any change in the results, we can think that the 
entrepreneur must exert an effort which is critical for the continuation of the project in the slow 
state (as in Rajan, 1992, for example). If the entrepreneur expects the rent extration, she will not 
exert the effort. Hence, the only way to ensure the continuation of a project will be to enter a 
non-renegotiable contract.
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(t =  i, n) and a safe (risky) project15
(1 -  a){Y  -  R *) + ad l(Y  -  p ,i? ) , (6.3)
(1 — a )(Y  — R f) + ad?r(Y  + y — prR1) t = i,n . (6.4)
Lenders Suppose that at date 1 the slow state is realized and the lender has to
choose whether to refinance the project. An incumbent will refinance (dj =  1) if 
and only if
qA < p jR 1 +  (1 -  Pj)q -  I\ j  = s ,r , (6.5)
i.e. if and only if the return from the redeployment of the A  non-depreciated assets 
is lower than the net expected return from refinancing (we assume that if indifferent 
a lender will not refinance). Note that, all else equal, in equilibrium the agreed 
repayment to a lender will always exceed q. Hence, the lower the probability of 
success p j  of a project, the weaker is the incentive of an incumbent to refinance.
Analogously, a newcomer will refinance (dj = 1) if and only if
OqA <  P j R n  +  ( 1  — P j ) 0 q  — I \  j  =  s , r, (6.6)
where the only difference from the corresponding condition of an incumbent is the 
lower return that the newcomer obtains from recovering and redeploying the assets of 
her borrower. It is easy to see that, because of this lower return from the liquidation 
of assets, for a given type of project, liquidation price q and repayment R, newcomers 
have a stronger incentive to refinance than incumbents.
15 Throughout the analysis we focus on the case in which, in case of success, output always exceeds 
the agreed repayment. It is straightforward to verify that we can always choose values of Y  that 
are consistent with the parameter restrictions and such that the limited liability constraint of the 
entrepreneur does not bind. Moreover, we focus on the case in which the agreed repayment always 
exceeds the liquidation value of assets, i.e. qA < R. In fact, the maximum value of q is pa (see below 
in the analysis) and in Lemma 1 we will introduce restrictions on Io such that paA <  Iq. Therefore, 
necessarily in equilibrium R >  qA otherwise the lender would receive a repayment lower than Io and 
would not break even in equilibrium.
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At date 0, each lender must expect zero profits at least. The repayment R % (Rn) to 
an incumbent (a newcomer) has to satisfy the non-negative profit condition of the 
incumbent (newcomer) (7) ((8)):
(1 -  a)R l + a  {dj [pjR1 +  (1 -  pj)q -  I\] +  (1 -  dj)qA} > I0, (6.7)
(1 -  a)R n +  a {dj \pjRn +  (1 - Pj)9q -  fy] +  (1 -  <T-)0qA} > Iq. (6.8)
The only difference between the non-negative profit condition of an incumbent 
and that of a newcomer is the lower return that a newcomer obtains from the rede­
ployment of assets. It is easy to see that, for a given type of project, liquidation price 
q, lender’s expected return and refinancing decision, borrowing from a newcomer is 
more costly (R n > R l) because a newcomer expects a lower return from liquidation 
if a project fails.
Secondary M ark e t In the secondary market, all the entrepreneurs who can pro­
duce more than q with it will demand one liquidated asset. Therefore, the demand 
for assets is
D = aPr(A  > q) =  a(£ — q). (6.9)
Assumption (1) guarantees that in equilibrium necessarily all entrepreneurs are 
funded and implement projects. Then, let y3 be the share of entrepreneurs who 
choose safe projects.16 Let also Ss (Sr) stand for the share of safe (risky) projects 
activated at date 0 and in the slow state at date 1 that are refinanced. The supply 
of assets is
S  = a  {(1 -  Ps)ys&9 +  (1 -  Pr){ 1 ~ ys)&r +  [1 ~  8ays -  6r ( 1 -  ?/a)] A} . (6.10)
16 Since contracts are not contingent on entrepreneurs’ choice of projects, ys defines a threshold 
specific return such that entrepreneurs with y < ya choose safe projects.
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The supply is given by the share of projects that are in the slow state at date 
1 and fail at date 2 times the number of assets liquidated for each project that 
fails. In turn, using the law of large numbers, the share of projects that fail is given 
by the share of projects not refinanced 1 — 6sys — Sr( 1 — ya) plus the fraction that 
are refinanced times the share of refinanced projects that fail. Finally, the fraction 
of safe refinanced projects that fail is 1 — ps while the fraction of risky refinanced 
projects that fail is 1 — pr.
E quilib rium  C harac te riza tio n  Let yl (1 — yl) be the fraction of entrepreneurs 
who borrow from incumbents (newcomers). The equilibrium is defined by a vector 
(dls,d ,^<Tr1d!^,53,Sr,K l,R n,q ,y3,y %) such that entrepreneurs and lenders maximize 
their utility, the non-negative profit conditions of lenders hold and the credit and 
the secondary market clear. Lemma 1 characterizes the conditions under which in 
equilibrium incumbents and newcomers coexist in the credit market, making the 
analysis meaningful.
LEMMA 1: Suppose that 9 <  9 <  9 and Io > Io (see the Appendix for the 
values of 9, 9 and Iq as functions of the parameters of the model). In equilibrium 
a share y3 — y1 of entrepreneurs (with 0 < ys < 1) borrow from incumbents and 
choose safe projects and a share 1 — ys = 1 — yl borrow from newcomers and choose 
risky projects. Incumbent and newcomers are always expected to refinance projects 
(5S = Sr = 4  =  d% = 1).
The intuition behind lemma 1 is as follows. All else equal, the lower liquidation 
skills of newcomers make their funding more costly because they expect a lower re­
turn from asset liquidation if a project fails. However, their lower liquidation skills 
render newcomers softer in liquidating projects. In fact, because of their strong 
ability to redeploy the assets of their borrowers, incumbents have high incentive to 
liquidate projects prematurely rather than refinancing them. In particular, since
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risky projects have high probability of failure, incumbents must be offered a par­
ticularly high repayment R l to refinance them. Instead, if their disadvantage in 
liquidating assets is not too small, newcomers will always have the incentive to re­
finance risky projects, even at the repayment that guarantees them expected zero 
profits at date 0.
In the analysis, we restrict ourselves to the region of the parameter space iden­
tified in lemma 1. The restriction I q > Io guarantees that incumbents are willing to 
refinance safe projects at the repayment that guarantees them expected zero profits 
at date 0. The restriction 9 <  9 < 9 guarantees that newcomers are willing to refi­
nance both safe and risky projects at the repayment that guarantees them expected 
zero profits and that the repayment that induces an incumbent to refinance a risky 
project exceeds the one that guarantees expected zero profits to a newcomer. In 
equilibrium, entrepreneurs who derive a high return y from a risky project borrow 
from newcomers, sustaining the associated extra cost of funding, and choose high- 
risk/return projects; entrepreneurs who derive a low return from a risky project 
borrow from incumbents and choose safe projects, saving on funding costs. Hence­
forth, we define equivalently with ys (1 — ys) the share of entrepreneurs who choose 
safe (risky) projects and who borrow from incumbents (newcomers). In the proof of 
lemma 1 we report the equilibrium values of y3, q, R l and R n.
6.1 .3  Im pact o f  a  Shock
We now show that shocks to asset liquidity can originate waves of entry of newcomers 
that mutually interact with increases in project riskiness through liquidation values. 
In the next subsection, we analyze output implications of this interaction. We 
consider an exogenous shock to asset liquidity in the form of a shock to the number 
of potential second-hand users of assets. We assume that the shock occurs at the 
beginning of time, before contracts are written. Henceforth, when we refer to the
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effects of this shock and to changes in the variables, we implicitly compare the 
equilibrium that is realized in our economy with the one that would be realized in 
the absence of the shock.
The shock to the number of potential second-hand users proxies for any aggregate 
shock that, by modifying firms’ possibility to buy assets in the secondary market, 
affects the liquidation value of assets exogenously. It could be a change of the 
cash flow of potential users due to a boom or recession or a change in government 
regulation that affects the number of potential second-hand users directly, like a 
change in antitrust policies and in limitations of foreign investment (Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992)).
We consider a negative shock and we assume that a fraction of the most efficient 
users of liquidated assets exit the secondary market. Formally, we assume that I  falls 
so that the demand for assets shifts inward in a parallel way. Proposition 1 presents 
the first result of the paper.
PROPOSITION 1: A fall in the demand for firm s’ assets increases the share 
of entrepreneurs borrowing from newcomers and implementing risky projects and 
decreases the liquidation value of assets. These effects are bigger the stronger is the 
disadvantage of newcomers in liquidating assets (i.e. the lower is 6).
The intuition behind proposition 1 is as follows. Following a shrink in the de­
mand for firms’ assets, in the secondary market supply exceeds demand and the 
liquidation price of assets falls. Newcomers face a liquidation cost proportional to 
the value of the assets they liquidate so that the price fall erodes their expected re­
turn from liquidation less than that of incumbents and the gap Rn — R 1 narrows. By 
eroding the cost advantage of incumbents, the price fall pushes some entrepreneurs 
to switch to newcomers. Since entrepreneurs choose risky projects when borrowing 
from newcomers, the share of risky projects, and hence the expected default rate and 
supply of assets, rise. In turn, this induces a further fall of liquidation values and
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erosion of the cost advantage of incumbents and so forth, until a new equilibrium is 
reached. The magnitude of these effects is inversely related to 6. The erosion in the 
cost advantage of incumbents due to falls in liquidation values is bigger the lower 
is 8. Therefore, the overall increase in the share of entrepreneurs who choose new­
comers and risky projects and decrease in the liquidation value of assets is inversely 
related to 6. In sum, the result in proposition 1 incorporates a mutually reinforcing 
interaction between the entry of lenders foreign to the market and the share of risky 
projects, with the link being firms’ liquidation values.17
Assumption (2) on 9 guarantees that declines in liquidation values resulting from 
increases in the share of risky projects encourage further entrepreneurs to switch 
to newcomers and risky projects. In fact, a standard, opposite force makes risky 
projects less appealing as liquidation values fall. Since a risky project fails and 
leads to the liquidation of the residual asset with higher probability than a safe one, 
its expected return is eroded by a fall in the liquidation price more than that of a 
safe project. This conventional effect is unrelated to differences across lenders and 
would also operate in an economy populated only by incumbents. The condition 
9 < (1 — ps)/ (I — pr) ensures that the erosion of the cost advantage of incumbents 
deriving from their higher liquidation skills overwhelms this standard effect and 
declines in the liquidation price of assets spur the share of risky projects.
6 .1 .4  O u tp u t
We now analyze the output implications of the model. Consistent with proposition 
1, we consider a negative shock to asset liquidity. The decline in the return from 
liquidated assets due to the fall in the average productivity of second-hand users has
17 Note that in the model the entry of new lenders is associated with a rise in loan rates. This 
could appear at odds with the popular view that the entry of new lenders tends to reduce loan 
rates, mainly by favoring competition. However, what is crucial for our results is that the spread 
between the loan rates charged by new lenders and those charged by incumbents narrows and not 
that loan rates increase. Possibly, one could think of a richer framework in which the entry of new 
lenders leads to a decline in loan rates but the mechanism in the model is fully operational.
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a direct negative impact on output. In this subsection, we investigate the indirect 
impact of the shock on output due to the change in the share y3 of safe projects and 
how this impact depends on the disadvantage of newcomers in liquidating assets. 
We also analyze how the share of safe projects changes relative to the share of safe 
projects that would be chosen by a social planner maximizing total output.
In comparing the composition of projects in the decentralized equilibrium with 
the one that would be chosen by a social planner we do not need to take into account 
the nature of the liquidation cost. The liquidation cost can be a real resource loss, 
like a dead-weight output loss due to the sale of the asset to an inefficient second­
hand user. Alternatively, the liquidation cost can be a transfer, like a fee a newcomer 
pays to an efficient liquidator of the asset, i.e. someone facing no liquidation cost.18 
The social planner’s optimal ya will be independent of whether the liquidation cost 
is real or a transfer. In fact, if the liquidation cost is real, the social planner will 
be able to induce incumbents to fund risky projects engaging in transfers among 
agents.19 Therefore, newcomers will not participate in the credit market at date 0 
and their real liquidation cost will not affect output to be maximized.
In proposition 2 we compare the share of risky projects in our economy with the 
one that would be chosen by a social planner.
PROPOSITION 2: Regardless of whether the liquidation cost of newcomers is 
a real cost or a transfer, the share of risky projects is lower than the optimal share 
(equal to 1) that maximizes total output.
18 The fees collected could be rebated to agents as a lump sum, hence not affecting their decisions. 
In a model with transaction costs in trading capital in the secondary market, Bencivenga, Smith 
and Starr (1996) distinguish between transaction costs that are real resource costs and transaction 
costs that are pure transfers (such as fees or rents to brokers or market makers). In a different 
context, Diamond and Rajan (2001a) distinguish between the cases in which a new lender can and 
cannot address an old lender familiar with the assets of the firm for liquidation. In their context, 
the entrepreneur herself is an efficient liquidator, so that the lower liquidation ability of new lenders 
never results in a social loss.
19 For example, the planner could tax all the lenders who liquidate more than one asset in the 
secondary market discouraging the premature liquidation of projects.
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The intuition behind proposition 2 is as follows. The combination of contrac­
tual incompleteness and high liquidation skills of incumbents render the latter too 
conservative towards high-risk/return projects. Entrepreneurs can implement these 
projects by borrowing from newcomers but newcomers are only an imperfect substi­
tute for incumbents. In fact, newcomers impose on entrepreneurs the cost of their 
low liquidation skills, discouraging some entrepreneurs from borrowing from them 
and implementing risky projects.20Therefore, the liquidation cost of newcomers dis­
torts the share of risky projects downward.
Proposition 2 implies that, regardless of the nature of the liquidation cost, the 
increase in the share of risky projects that follows a negative liquidity shock increases 
output and that the stronger is the described mechanism (the lower is 6) the bigger 
the output rise is. In fact, when a negative shock to asset liquidity occurs and 
the price of assets falls, the liquidation cost of newcomers falls with it and more 
entrepreneurs choose newcomers and risky projects. Therefore, the share of risky 
projects approaches the social optimum.
COROLLARY 1: The increase in the share of risky projects l —ys induced by a 
fall in the demand for firm s’ assets increases output, whether the liquidation cost of 
newcomers is a real cost or a transfer. This output rise is inversely related to 6. 
After the shock the share of risky projects is closer to the optimal one.
Generalizing it to a positive shock, corollary 1 shows that the interaction between
20The liquidation cost has also an indirect distortionary effect. Consider the following thought 
experiment. Assume that the cost is real and that necessarily incumbents (newcomers) fund safe 
(risky) projects even in the centralized equilibrium. It can be shown that the share of risky projects 
in the decentralized equilibrium is lower than the optimal choice of the social planner. Two ex­
ternalities are at work. On the one hand, entrepreneurs tend to choose risky projects too often 
because they take the average productivity of liquidated assets as given. Therefore, they do not 
internalize the bigger reduction in the average productivity of liquidated assets that occurs when 
they choose risky projects. On the other hand, entrepreneurs do not fully internalize the social 
return of a liquidated asset since they care only about its resale price q. This makes them choose 
safe projects too often. When 9 is equal to one the two externalities offset each other and the share 
of risky projects is the optimal one. When 6 is below one the latter externality is stronger and the 
share of risky projects is too low.
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the entry of newcomers and the share of high-risk/return projects generates a change 
in output opposite in sign to the direct effect of a liquidity shock. Put differently, 
this interaction acts as a stabilizer when shocks to asset liquidity are realized. An 
immediate policy implication is that not only binding regulatory restrictions to the 
entry of new (foreign) lenders reduce output by further depressing the share of high- 
risk/return projects (proposition 2),21 but also they increase output volatility.
6.1 .5  E n dogenous L iqu idation  Skills
The key assumption of the model is the lower ability of newcomers to extract value 
from the assets of bankrupt firms. The advantage of incumbents in liquidating assets 
can be motivated in several ways. However, the model offers a straightforward way 
to endogenize this advantage. Since second-hand users differ in their efficiency in 
producing with the assets of bankrupt firms, an incumbent could find easier to iden­
tify the most efficient users of these assets. Ramey and Shapiro (2001, p. 961) stress 
the importance of search costs in the redeployment of assets and argue that “Thin 
markets and costly search complicate the process of finding buyers whose needs best 
match the capital’s characteristics. The cost of search includes not only monetary 
costs, but also the time it takes to find good matches within the industry” . We now 
analyze a simple way to endogenize the disadvantage of newcomers in liquidating 
assets along this intuition.
Suppose that the secondary market for firms’ assets is segmented in two islands: 
one island is populated by highly productive users (A > A) while the other is popu­
lated by low productive users (A < A). At date 2, lenders have to decide in which 
island to sell the recovered assets. The choice of island is reversible but, once an
21 The inefficiency in our economy can be compared to that in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). 
In a context in which lenders cannot distinguish between long term, very profitable projects and 
long term poor ones, borrowing from multiple lenders dilutes the incentive of lenders to gather 
information for the continuation of projects. This leads to the liquidation of very profitable projects 
and, therefore, deters their implementation ex-ante. Both the rationale for the inefficiency in our 
economy and the type of the projects deterred differ from Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).
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island has been chosen, switching to the other has a cost of 2(1 — 9) times the value 
of the assets to be sold. For example, we can think that a “shipper” offers trans­
portation between the two islands and the switching cost is the fee charged by the 
shipper.22 Assume also that in the two islands the sale of assets takes place after 
any switching has occurred. Finally, while ex-ante incumbents know the type of 
users who populate each island, newcomers cannot observe it until they have chosen 
island. Therefore, with probability 1/2 newcomers will initially select the island pop­
ulated by low productive users. In particular, assume that newcomers have chosen 
the island populated by low productive users. Provided the difference between the 
liquidation price in the two islands exceeds the cost of switching island, newcomers 
will always switch and sell the recovered assets in the island populated by highly 
productive users. Denoting with q the liquidation price in the island with highly pro­
ductive users, a sufficient condition for the switching to occur is q — A > 2(1 — 0)q.23 
At date 0 the expected date 2 liquidation cost faced by a newcomer in redeploying 
the residual asset of her borrower will be (1 — 0)q.
6.2 A pplications and Em pirical A ssessm ent
In section 6.2.1 we discuss an alternative application of the model in which, rather 
than focussing on cyclical changes in asset liquidity, we reinterpret our results in the 
light of cross-sectional differences in asset liquidity. In sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 we 
discuss limitations of the model. Finally, in 6.2.4 we assess the empirical predictions 
of the model, comparing them with the existing evidence.
22 The shipper could be a metaphor for any middle-man who helps inexperienced newcomers to 
find the best users of assets in the secondary market.
2^ Clearly, this condition is meaningful only if 0 ^ 1/2.
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6.2 .1  L iquid and Illiquid  M arkets
In sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 we have considered cyclical changes in the liquidity of 
assets. Besides changing over time, asset liquidity differs across sectors/economies 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). Therefore, our results could be reinterpreted in terms 
of cross-sectional differences in the presence of new (foreign) lenders and in the risk­
iness of projects. In particular, proposition 1 predicts that, if the liquidation skills 
of newcomers are not too high, environments with low asset liquidity will feature 
a higher share of newcomers and high-risk/return projects and that cross-sectional 
differences will be stronger the bigger is the liquidation disadvantage of newcomers. 
This result could explain why, from the mid-1980’s to the 1997-98 crisis, East Asian 
countries experienced both an increasing illiquidity of projects and a strong pene­
tration of foreign lending. Focussing on short term, foreign lending intermediated 
by domestic banks, Diamond and Rajan (2001b) argue that this allowed domestic 
banks to commit their superior liquidation skills and fund highly productive but 
illiquid projects. Focussing on direct foreign lending, our model offers a different ex­
planation based on the increasing productivity and riskiness of these projects. This 
would have endogenously depressed expected liquidation values, increasing the in­
centive of firms to forego the liquidation skills of domestic lenders for the willingness 
of foreign lenders to fund high-risk/return projects. Interestingly, our explanation 
can complement that put forward by Diamond and Rajan (2001b). In fact, while 
their argument appears especially relevant for those East Asian countries in which 
foreign lending was mainly intermediated by domestic banks, our argument would 
apply to those countries, such as Indonesia, in which the inflow of foreign funds was 
more direct than intermediated by domestic lenders.
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6.2 .2  F irm  and  Sector Specific ity
The core assumption that drives our results is the higher ability of incumbents to 
recover and/or liquidate the assets of borrowers. As shown in section 6.1.5, when the 
second-hand users of assets have heterogeneous efficiency in using liquidated assets, 
this higher ability can be interpreted as incumbents’ higher ability to identify the 
best users in the secondary market. This interpretation will be reasonable if the 
specificity of assets is at the firm level, i.e. if the firms within the sector/region 
familiar to incumbents feature heterogenous efficiency in using liquidated assets. 
Conversely, this interpretation will be less relevant if the heterogeneous ability to 
use assets is at the sectorial level, i.e. firms within the sector/region familiar to 
incumbents have the same ability but firms outside the sector have lower ability 
to use liquidated assets. In this case, incumbents’ knowledge of sector-insiders will 
probably give them little advantage over newcomers in redeploying assets.
6.2 .3  E m erging and  Industria lized  E conom ies
The model can be applied to different contexts. For example, we have shown that 
it can help to explain the evolution of projects in East Asian countries during the 
second half of the 1980’s and the 1990’s. Obviously, other mechanisms of interac­
tion between foreign lenders and incumbent economic actors can be at work. Thus, 
the question becomes: in what contexts do we expect the described mechanism to 
be especially important relative to other possible mechanisms of interaction? If 
we interpret newcomers as foreign lenders, we believe that the described mecha­
nism can be relatively more important for cross-border lending across industrial­
ized economies. Lenders of an industrialized country that operate in an emerging 
economy may have higher efficiency and monitoring ability than local lenders. For 
example, Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000) find that, in the second half of the 
nineties, by exploiting their high monitoring ability, in Mexico and in Argentina
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foreign banks engaged in cherry-picking activities, leaving less lucrative, riskier cus­
tomers to domestic lenders.24 Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that entrant 
banks from industrialized economies can rely on cheaper sources of funds than local 
banks, typically because of a reputational advantage in the international financial 
markets (Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000)). This will be especially likely if en­
trant banks are subsidiaries of well-established foreign banks. In the model, instead, 
we have ruled out any heterogeneity in lenders’ monitoring ability or funding op­
portunities, restricting lenders’ heterogeneity to a different knowledge of the local 
market. For this reason, we believe that cross-border lending across industrialized 
countries constitutes the best application of our setup. In fact, in this case there is 
no reason to expect that foreign lenders have an intrinsic advantage or disadvantage 
relative to incumbents.
6 .2 .4  E m pirical A ssessm en t
We now assess the empirical predictions of the model, comparing them with those of 
related studies and with the existing evidence. We classify predictions according to 
whether they refer to the impact of the share of foreign lending on the fundamentals 
of the economy (riskiness of projects, firms’ liquidation values and output) or on the 
feedback effect.
i) Impact of the share of foreign lending on fundamentals. The model predicts 
that the diffusion of new (foreign) lenders increases the riskiness of projects and leads 
to a decline in firms’ liquidation values. While the first implication can be obtained 
in a model of adverse selection (Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999)), existing models do not 
offer predictions on the pattern of liquidation values at the time of new lenders’ 
entry.
24 In general, the authors argue that the overall effect of the higher efficiency of foreign lenders 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, the efficiency of foreign banks can have a positive spill-over effect 
on domestic lenders. On the other hand, by cherry picking the most lucrative customers, foreign 
banks can harm domestic institutions.
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ii) Impact of fundamentals on the share of foreign lending. The model predicts 
that increases in the riskiness of projects foster the diffusion of new lenders. As 
argued in the Introduction, assuming that new lenders are exposed to more severe 
adverse selection than incumbent ones would imply that increases in the riskiness 
of projects deter the entry new lenders (Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999)). The model 
also predicts that declines in the liquidity and liquidation values of assets foster the 
diffusion of new lenders. To the extent that asset liquidity is procyclical,25 the model 
implies therefore a countercyclical pattern of the relative share of foreign lending. 
Finally, the model predicts that, at least if we limit ourselves to shocks to asset 
liquidity, economies with less restrictions to the entry of foreign lenders experience 
lower output volatility.
The empirical literature on the pattern of foreign and domestic lending and, more 
generally, on the entry into a credit market is at its early stages. Dages, Goldberg 
and Kinney (2000) argue that, while a sizable body of literature has explored the 
potential effects of financial liberalization broadly meant, few studies have analyzed 
the effects of an increased foreign participation in banking and finance. Further­
more, these studies have generally focused on the impact of entry on the efficiency 
and competitiveness of the local credit market, neglecting the lending behavior of 
foreign and domestic financiers, its (possibly different) response to cyclical changes 
in fundamentals and its feedback on fundamentals. Dages, Goldberg and Kinney 
(2000), Goldberg (2002) and Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2003) are among the ex­
ceptions we are aware of. Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000) find that in Mexico 
and in Argentina in the late nineties the relative share of foreign lending exhib­
ited an anticyclical pattern. Goldberg (2002) finds that the lending of US banks 
to industrialized countries does not respond significantly to cyclical changes in the 
fundamentals of the host country, less so than the lending of domestic banks. Fi­
25 For example, during a recession the cash flow of potential users can be lower, leading to a 
contraction in the demand for assets.
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nally, Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2003) focus on interstate branching in the United 
States and find a negative correlation between out-of-state bank share and within 
state business volatility. All these results are consistent with the predictions of the 
model.
The existing evidence is therefore broadly supportive of the model findings. How­
ever, this evidence is still too scarce to draw conclusions. In particular, the above 
studies do not allow to disentangle the specific contribution of different mechanisms 
of interaction between foreign lenders and incumbent economic actors.26 In a study 
in progress based on data on US banks, we aim at assessing the contribution of our 
mechanism and of alternative ones to the observed pattern of international banking 
flows.
6.3 C onclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the interaction between the entry of lenders 
“foreign” to a market, the nature of projects and firms’ liquidation values. In our 
economy, the combination of contractual incompleteness and high liquidation skills of 
incumbent lenders render the latter conservative towards high-risk/return projects. 
Possibly because of lack of knowledge of the local insolvency practices or secondary 
market, new (foreign) lenders exhibit a disadvantage in recovering and liquidating 
the assets of borrowers relative to incumbents. This implies that foreign lenders 
have a softer budget constraint towards high-risk/return projects and specialize in 
their financing, leaving low return, safe borrowers to incumbents.
When a negative shock to asset liquidity is realized, the fall in firms’ liquidation 
values erodes the comparative cost advantage of incumbents deriving from their 
higher liquidation skills, pushing more firms to choose foreign lenders and high-
26 Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000) conceptually discuss possible explanations for the pattern 
of the share of foreign lending based on the different efficiency and funding opportunities of foreign 
and domestic lenders.
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risk/return projects. The fall in liquidation values due to the increased riskiness 
of projects further erodes the cost advantage of incumbents and so forth. This 
interaction acts as a stabilizer, dampening the output impact of liquidity shocks, 
such as those occurring in booms and recessions.
In the wake of the financial crises that have recently hit liberalized countries, 
such as the Nordic countries and the East Asian countries, widespread concerns 
have developed on the possibly destabilizing effects of financial liberalization. The 
model suggests instead a channel through which an economy more open to the direct 
presence of (new) foreign financial institutions enjoys greater stability.
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6.4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 : The values of I q, 9, and 6 are respectively
_/q =  +  ( i  _  a  _j_ a p s ) (,4  _  i )  +  P g -
Ps
_  Ip -  /i(l + g p r ) -  ( 1 - 1 +  P r ) { A  -  1 +  pr)(l -  a  +  a p r ) .
a { l - p r ) { £ - l + P r )
0  ____________ P r h  -  (1 -  a)/i____________
(1 -  a +  apr)(psA -  1 + pr) + pro:(l -  pr)pa'
It is easily verified that there exist regions of the parameter space such that the 
interval [j0,0] is non-empty and the restriction Iq >  Iq and assumption (2) hold. We 
show first that it is possible to write a contract with an incumbent that guarantees 
her zero profits and gives her incentives to continue a safe project at date 1 (dg =  1). 
Using (5) and (7), for this to be true it has to be that [To +  a h  — a ( l  — p a)q\ /( I  — 
a - h a p  s ) >  [qA -f I \  — (1 — p s )q\ j p 3. The highest possible value of q is p s . The lower 
bound on Iq guarantees that the inequality is always verified. Observe also that, 
all else equal, the gross repayment that guarantees zero profits to an incumbent is 
always lower than the one that guarantees zero profits to a newcomer. This implies 
that for a borrower the choice of a safe project financed by a newcomer is necessarily 
dominated. Moreover, it will never be preferable to write a contract with a lender 
that leads her to liquidate a project (S3 =  8r =  1). In fact, it is straightforward 
that this would be dominated by a contract with an incumbent that leads her to 
continue a safe project and guarantees her zero profits. We now show that, if 
0 < 9 ,  at the repayment that guarantees her expected zero profits, a newcomer has 
always the incentive to continue a project, whether safe or risky {dlf =  d? =  1). In 
fact, using (6), to have d” =  1, it has to be that 9 q A  +  I \  <  p j R n +  (1 — Pj)9q .  
Using (8), in an equilibrium in which a newcomer continues a project and realizes 
zero profits, R n =  [Iq +  a l \  -  a ( l  -  Pj)9q]  /  (I -  ot +  a p j ). Moreover, the maximum
(Al)
(A2)
(A3)
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value of q is p s . Plugging these values into the inequality above, we have that if 
6 < 9 it will be satisfied. We now show that if, in addition, 6 > 0, an entrepreneur 
will never choose an incumbent to finance a risky project. In fact, using (5), the 
minimum repayment that would give an incumbent the incentive to refinance a 
risky project is [qA +  h  — (1 — p r )q ] / Pr  that, from the restriction 6 > 0, certainly 
exceeds the repayment that guarantees zero profits to a newcomer under a risky 
project for any feasible value of q. All the above implies y3 = yl. We now show that 
0 < y3 < 1. Considering the zero profit conditions of a newcomer funding a risky 
project and of an incumbent funding a safe project, we obtain respectively:
R n =  h  + < x h -a ( l-P r )0 q  ^
1 — a  +  apr 
=  Io +  a h - a ( l - p , ) q  
1 — a  +  apa
Substituting 6S =  Sr =  1 into the right hand side of (10) and using (9) and (10), 
we obtain the price q that equates demand and supply in the secondary market as 
a function of the share of safe projects y3. Analogously, equalizing (3) and (4), we 
obtain the share of safe projects ys as a function of q, R n and R l. The values of q 
and y3 are respectively:
Q =  ( P s ~  P r ) y 3 +  £ - l + p r (A6)
Vs =  ^  {[(1 -  oc) +  a p r] R n -  [(1 -  a )  +  a p 3] R 1} . (A7)
Substituting the values of R n and R l from (A4) and (A5) into the right hand side 
of (A7) and solving the system (A6) and (A7), we obtain:
[1 Ps (1 Pr)@\ (I 1 Pr) rARx
Vl  1 - [ ( P . - P r ) [ l - P . - ( 1 - P r ) 0 ] ] ‘ 1 1
It is straightforward that the right hand side of (A8) is always positive and
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smaller than 1.
Proof of Proposition 1 : To prove the proposition it is sufficient to show that ys 
decreases when £ decreases (negative demand shock) and the decrease is stronger 
the lower is 9. Computing the derivative of ys with respect to £, we obtain
dys =  [ ( l - p ^ - C l - p r ) # ]  rA v
d i  1 -  (Ps -  Pr)  [(1 -  Ps)  -  (1 -  Pr)9]  ’
which is positive if 9 < (1 — ps) /( l  — Pr)-  In turn, differentiating it with respect 
to 9 we obtain
d ( d y a\ _  (1 — Pr)  {1 — 2(pa —  Pr)  [(1 — Pb)  -  (1 — Pr)#]}
a e \ a e j  {1 -  (p. -  Pr) [(i -  Pa) -  ( i -  Pr) W
Observe that 1 — 2(ps — pr ) ((1 — ps) — (1 — pr)9) > 0 since the maximum of 2{p3 — 
pr) ((1 — Ps) — (1 — pr)9) is reached at 9 = 0, pr = 0, p3 =  1/2 where the expression 
is equal to 1/2. This implies that d(dys/d£) fd9  is negative.
Proof of Proposition 2: A social planner would choose the optimal share of safe 
projects in order to maximize
Y{ys) = Y - h  + a l
+  (1 -  Vs) [ (1 - P r ) { i + q ) , (l-Vs)(l+ys) 2
• (All)
On the right hand side of (All),  the terms in the two square brackets are the average 
productivity of a liquidated asset (£ +  q)/2  times the probability that respectively 
a safe and risky project fails. The last term on the right hand side is the total 
specific returns enjoyed by entrepreneurs who choose risky projects. Let us plug 
Q — (Ps — Pr)Vs +  £ — 1 +  pr into Y(ys). Define the share of safe projects that 
maximizes Y(y3) as ys y . We need to show that y3^  < ys. Solving for ys y> we
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( P r - P a ) ( i - 1 + P r ) ,AloA
y , . v = — / .  a  —  <  0 ( )
obtain
*a'V 1 +  (ps ~ P r ) :
This implies that the share of safe projects chosen by the social planner is ys p =  
0 < ys.
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